Gate City Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Edward A. Dalton, Jr., John C. Forrester, Jr., Michael C. Johnsen, and Daniel W. Marcum, et al. : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
Gate City Federal Savings and Loan Association v.
Edward A. Dalton, Jr., John C. Forrester, Jr., Michael
C. Johnsen, and Daniel W. Marcum, et al. : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Clark W. Sessions; Roy B. Moore; Kevin E. Anderson; Clark L. Snelson; Sessions and Moore;
Attorneys for Appellant.
Earl Jay Peck; John K. Mangum; Douglas K. Pehrson; Jay R. Mohlman; Nielsen and Senior;
Attorneys for Respondents.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Gate City Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Dalton, No. 890498 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2110
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. - 1' W CA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GATE CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
EDWARD A. DALTON, JR., JOHN C. 
FORRESTER, JR., MICHAEL C. 
JOHNSEN, and DANIEL W. MARCUM, 
et al., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Docket No. 89-498-CA 
PRIORITY CLASSIFICATION 
NO. 14(b) 
Appeal of an Order of the Third District Court of Summit 
County, Judge J. Dennis Frederick. 
Clark W. Sessions 
Roy B. Moore 
Kevin E. Anderson 
Clark L. Snelson 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
400 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Earl Jay Peck 
John K. Mangum 
Douglas K. Pehrson 
Jay R. Mohlman 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Respondents 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
D 
OCT 2 4J1989 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GATE CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
EDWARD A. DALTON, JR., JOHN C. 
FORRESTER, JR., MICHAEL C. 
JOHNSEN, and DANIEL W. MARCUM, 
et al., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Docket No. 89-498-CA 
PRIORITY CLASSIFICATION 
NO. 14(b) 
Appeal of an Order of the Third District Court of Summit 
County, Judge J. Dennis Frederick. 
Clark W. Sessions 
Roy B. Moore 
Kevin E. Anderson 
Clark L. Snelson 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
400 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Earl Jay Peck 
John K. Mangum 
Douglas K. Pehrson 
Jay R. Mohlman 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Respondents 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The following is a complete list of all persons and entities 
which are currently parties to the proceeding before the Court• 
Plaintiff, Gate City Federal Savings and Loan Association, is a 
National Association with its principal place of business in Fargo, 
North Dakota, Defendants are Daniel W. Marcum, Dr. Edward A. 
Dalton, Jr., Michael C. Johnsen, John C. Forrester, Jr., Graham 
Dodd, Dwight H. Eagan, Christian E. Hansen, David E. Jones, Matthew 
R. White, R. John Eyre, Kelvyn H. Cullimore, Thomas G. Osborne, W. 
Truman Rigby, Donald L. Smith, Jedd P. Jones, Clive A. Pusey, 
Dennis L. Crockett, Steven L. Blazer, 0. Jay Call, Marden Spencer, 
Kenneth P. Colledge, J. Ray Fisher, John C. Forrester, Marvin L. 
Mills. In addition to the parties above named there were in the 
lower Court additional parties named as defendants in each of the 
original eleven foreclosure actions. These parties were owners of 
time share interests in the properties and have either stipulated 
to judgment or had a default judgment entered against them, which 
judgments are not before the Court on this appeal. A complete list 
of these parties is contained in the original eleven case headings 
included in the Appendix as Exhibit "A." 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this appeal lies with the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j) (1987), this 
case having been transferred to the Court of Appeals on August 21, 
1989, at the direction of the Utah Supreme Court. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal of the Summary Judgment granted to Defen-
dants by the Third Judicial District Court, Judge J. Dennis 
Frederick presiding. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Trial Court err in determining, as a matter of 
law, that documents entitled "Indemnity Agreement," each of which, 
on its face, stated that its purpose was to indemnify the lender 
from mechanics' liens filed against the properties securing the 
Promissory Notes, constituted a written promise by a third person 
to assume liability for each of the loans in question? 
2. Did the Trial Court err in ruling as a matter of law that 
the Indemnity Agreements constituted unambiguous assumption 
agreements, accepted in writing by Plaintiff, which, under the 
terms of the Promissory Notes, would serve to release the Defen-
dants from all liability for repayment of the Promissory Notes? 
3. Did the Trial Court err in ruling that the conflicting 
Affidavits, Depositions and pleadings filed with the Trial Court 
GC-66A.PL3 1 
did not raise or reveal genuine issues of material fact regarding 
the intent of the parties to the Indemnity Agreements? 
4. Did the Trial Court err in construing the Indemnity 
Agreements to have an effect that was not apparent from the 
language of the agreements and was in direct conflict with the 
expressed intent of the parties to the agreements, and the actions 
of Defendants? 
5» Did the Trial Court err in finding a novation? 
6. Did the Trial Court err in ruling as a matter of law that 
there were no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that 
Defendants were thereby entitled to Judgment as a matter of law? 
7. Did the Trial Court err in finding that the Indemnity 
Agreements satisfied all the requirements of a release? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The determinative provisions are Utah Code Ann. § 57-15-8 and 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Appendix I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff filed eleven separate civil actions seeking judicial 
foreclosure of trust deeds executed by Defendants. The properties 
were sold pursuant to stipulation and Plaintiff is pursuing the 
resulting deficiencies from Defendants. On motion of Defendants, 
strongly opposed by Plaintiff, the Trial Court granted an order 
consolidating the eleven individual actions. Twenty of the twenty-
GC-66A.PL3 2 
three Defendants moved for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff 
alleging that there had been an assumption of liability by C.C. 
International and a release of Defendants by Plaintiff. By Minute 
Entry dated February 15, 1989 (See Appendix "B") Judge J, Dennis 
Frederick granted said Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Defendants Jedd P. Jones, 0. Jay Call and Kenneth B. Colledge did 
not join in the Motion and were not included in the Judgment. 
Plaintiff brought a motion for reconsideration which was heard on 
April 18, 1989. On reconsideration the Trial Court affirmed its 
Order granting Summary Judgment. In its Judgment entered April 28, 
1989 (See Appendix "C") the Trial Court certified its ruling as 
final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal with the Utah Supreme Court on 
May 22, 1989. Pursuant to notice dated August 21, 1989, the Utah 
Supreme Court assigned the case to the Utah Court of Appeals for 
determination. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In December of 1981 Plaintiff, Gate City Federal Savings and 
Loan Association, made eleven separate loans to groups of one or 
more of the Defendants for the purchase of newly constructed 
residential properties located at Jeremy Ranch in Summit County, 
Utah. At the time the loans were made the time for filing 
mechanics' and materialmen's liens had not expired. Record at 
GC-66A.PL3 3 
1340. Some of the Defendants qualified for the loans based on 
their individual financial strength; others combined in groups of 
two or more. Record at 593. Upon closing, Defendants received 
deeds to their respective properties from C.C. International, a 
company owned and operated by the builder and developer of the 
subject Jeremy Ranch properties, Vaughn Cook. Record at 1339. 
Defendants resold their properties to C.C. International pursuant 
to Uniform Real Estate Contracts. Deposition of Vaughn Cook 12-6-
88 at p. 301. 
C.C. International resold the properties to Kilburn Vacation 
Homeshares Inc., for the development of "homeshare" timeshare 
condominiums. Deposition of Vaughn Cook 11-21-88 at p. 99 and 
Deposition of 12-6-88 at p. 387-388. The homes were sold to C.C. 
International rather than directly to Kilburn to allow C.C. 
International to recover money it had coming from Kilburn. Cook 
Deposition of 12-6-88 at p. 387. 
It was the understanding of Defendants that Kilburn would 
assume responsibility for payment of the Promissory Notes in a two-
step process. Deposition of Vaughn Cook of 11-21-88 at p. 84. 
The first step would be a simple assumption which would not release 
Defendants on their obligations on the Notes. Deposition of Vaughn 
Cook of 12-6-88 at p. 274. This assumption is evidenced by the 
assumption agreements executed by each of the Defendants which 
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clearly state that the Defendants were not released from liability. 
Appendix "G". The second step was to be a formal application by 
Kilburn to assume Defendants' loans and have them released from 
liability. Cook Deposition of 12-6-88 page 275. This second step 
never occurred. Cook Deposition 12-6-88 at page 283. Timeshare 
condominium units were sold and payments were made on the loans for 
approximately two years. Record at 831. During that time, no 
application was received by Gate City for an assumption of the 
loans whereby Gate City would accept the credit and financial 
strength of the assuming party and release Defendants from 
liability. Record at 851. 
When the Notes went into default in the spring of 1984, 
Notices of Default were sent to the Defendants. Record at 831. 
The defaults were not cured, and Plaintiff filed eleven separate 
actions seeking judicial foreclosure of the Trust Deeds securing 
the Promissory Notes. Record at 991. The properties were sold 
pursuant to stipulation. Record at 300. Each of the sales 
resulted in a substantial deficiency which was pursued by Plaintiff 
in the eleven separate foreclosure actions. Record at 309. 
Defendants brought a motion to consolidate the eleven individual 
actions. Record at 245. Defendants' motion was granted over 
Plaintiff's objections that it would be prejudiced by allowing 
consolidation. Record at 498. Following consolidation and prior 
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to the scheduled trial date, twenty of the twenty-three Defendants, 
representing nine of the eleven individual actions, filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Record at 709. After hearing and argument 
the Trial Court, by Minute Entry dated February 15, 1989, ruled 
that a document entitled "Indemnity Agreement" executed by 
Plaintiff and C.C. International, which stated that C.C. Interna-
tional would indemnify Gate City from mechanics' liens filed 
against the properties, was "an unambiguous assumption agreement." 
Record at 935. The Trial Court also determined that Gate City had 
waived its right to accelerate under each of the Promissory Notes 
and that the waiver, coupled with the Indemnity Agreement, released 
Defendants' from liability pursuant to the terms of the Promissory 
Notes and Trust Deeds. Record at 935. 
Plaintiff's motion to have the Trial Court reconsider its 
decision was granted. Record at 1417. On reconsideration, the 
Trial Court affirmed its earlier ruling and certified its judgment 
as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Record at 1513. Gate City appeals from that final 
judgment. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court attempted, by ruling "as a matter of law," to 
avoid the myriad of factual issues raised by the pleadings, 
affidavits and depositions of the parties. In so doing, the Trial 
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Court erred in several fundamental respects. First, the Trial 
Court's interpretation of the document entitled "Indemnity 
Agreement" as an assumption agreement is wrong. This Court may 
interpret that document without any deference to the construction 
placed on it by the Trial Court. 
Second, the Trial Court erred in ruling that the document is 
unambiguous. An unambiguous document is subject to only one 
interpretation. Without reading any further, Appellant invites 
this Court to simply refer to the Indemnity Agreement included in 
the Appendix as Exhibit "D" and, upon reading that document, 
determine if it is unequivocally clear that C.C. International 
therein agrees to assume Defendants' obligations to repay Promis-
sory Notes to the Plaintiff in excess of $2,000,000. Plaintiff 
submits that not only is this meaning not clear from the language 
of the Indemnity Agreement, but that the language itself does not 
even imply such a result. 
Third, in basing its ruling solely on the four corners of the 
document, the Trial Court erred by ignoring the numerous facts, 
circumstances, actions and statements which evidence that the 
understanding and intent of all the parties in entering into the 
Indemnity Agreement was inconsistent with the Trial Court's 
interpretation. 
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Fourth, reference to other relevant documents executed 
contemporaneously is necessary and proper in determining whether 
a release had occurred. These documents are inconsistent with the 
Trial Court's ruling and raise factual questions which preclude 
summary judgment. 
Fifth, there exist genuine issues of material fact which 
preclude the interpretation of the Indemnity Agreement in the 
manner interpreted by the Trial Court and preclude summary judgment 
as a matter of law. 
Finally, even if the Indemnity Agreements are unambiguous 
assumption agreements, all the requirements for a release have not 
been met. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE 
INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS. 
In order to find Defendants had been released under the terms 
of the Promissory Notes and Trust Deeds the Court had to find that 
Defendants' successor in interest had executed a written assumption 
agreement, accepted in writing by Plaintiff. The clear language 
of the Indemnity Agreements does not support this interpretation. 
The Defendants' arguments interpreting the language of the 
Indemnity Agreements to be an "Assumption Agreement" are like a 
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magician's sleight-of-hand designed to distract his audience while 
making them believe they see something that does not exist. On 
Page 26 and 27 of the transcript of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Record at 1476) Defendants present the following 
argument: 
How did C.C. International get involved in this? It says 
that, "Whereas party of the first part," that's C.C. 
International, "has obtained from party of the second 
part," that's Gate City, "a first mortgage loan, has 
obtained a first mortgage loan for the principal balance 
of $200,000 on the following described property," how did 
C.C. International obtain this mortgage? 
The language, your Honor, that answers that question 
is contained at the bottom of the agreement. I've marked 
it. It says, "The obligation of the party of the first 
part," that's C.C. International, "in this agreement . 
..." Now, I've got to stop there and say, what is the 
obligation of the party of the first part? Well, it's 
contained right in that same paragraph and I've marked 
that in yellow. "Party of the first part," that's C.C, 
"agrees upon demand to indemnify party of the second part 
for any loss," and then skipping the irrelevant language, 
"it may sustain by reason of admitting to set out such 
liens," so that part of the language is talking about 
indemnity for the liens, but this next language then, the 
obligation. What obligation? The obligation to indem-
nify of C.C. International in this agreement shall extend 
to the mortgage, not such the liens. "It shall extend 
to the mortgage which has been executed by," by whom? 
"By C.C. International through," through whom? "Through 
C.C. International or for," for whom? UC.C. Interna-
tional, for the party of the first part," which is C.C. 
International, "of assigns," and I submit that might be 
a misprint, the assigns there, "on the above premises." 
The language is clear. 
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Defendants' argument is that C.C. International agrees to assume 
full and complete responsibility for repayment of each Defendant's 
personal obligation on each $200,000 Promissory Note. 
Slowed down and analyzed, we can see that what the Defendants 
would have us believe, like the magician's illusion, is not 
reality. Defendants would have us believe that the "obligation" 
C.C. International undertakes in the Indemnity Agreement is to pay 
—period; and, that the obligation extends to the mortgage. 
Defendants explain that the "obligation of the party of the 
first part" is to " 'indemnify the party of the second part for any 
loss,' then skipping the irrelevant language . . . . " The "ir-
relevant language" that Defendants would have us ignore is the 
heart of the agreement. It states: 
Party of the First Part agrees upon demand to indemnify 
Party of the Second Part for any loss (including but not 
limited to amounts paid in discharge of the lien, 
expenses of investigation, preparation for litigation, 
judgment, court costs, and attorney's fees) it may 
sustain by reason of omitting to set out such lien(s) as 
an exception in the mortgage executed hereunder or by 
reason of enforcement of this agreement. 
The obligation of the "Party of the First Part," C.C. Interna-
tional, is set forth more fully in the fourth paragraph of the 
Indemnity Agreement as follows: 
that if the Party of the Second Part shall omit from such 
mortgage an exception concerning one or more of such 
liens, filed or unfiled, and one or more such mechanics' 
and/or materialmen's liens, is, has been or may there-
after be filed or secured on the insured premises 
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effective or relating back to a date prior to the date 
of the policy, then, upon written demand of the Party of 
the Second Part, the Party of the First Part agrees to 
promptly secure the discharge of all such liens. 
Simply stated, the Indemnity Agreement provides that Gate City will 
exclude exceptions for mechanics' liens and that C.C. International 
"agrees to promptly secure the discharge of all such liens", and 
to indemnify Gate City for any loss it may sustain "by reason of 
omitting to set out such lien(s) as an exception in the mortgage 
. . . ." That is the obligation of the Party of the First Part, 
nothing less, nothing more. 
Defendants' argument, like the magician's trick, requires 
reliance on the obscure out of the context of the document as a 
whole, rather than reliance on the clear language and intent 
expressed by the Indemnity Agreement. Defendants would have the 
Court interpret one obscure provision by reference solely to 
another, creating a hall of mirrors in which reality is lost among 
the reflections. The Trial Court accepted Defendants' explanation 
of what are the only obscure passages in the document rather than 
read the document line by line to determine its meaning and the 
intent of the parties. 
Plaintiffs ask this Court to read the Indemnity Agreement 
attached as Appendix "D" line by line and to interpret that agree-
ment as a matter of law. In so doing this Court owes no deference 
GC-66A.PL3 11 
to the Trial Court's determination. Mountain Fuel Supply Co* v. 
Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988). The question to be 
determined is whether the Trial Court's interpretation of the 
Indemnity Agreement as an unambiguous assumption agreement, 
accepted in writing by Plaintiffs, was correct. Scharf v. BMG 
Corp. , 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985); Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 
(Utah 1982). If this Court determines that the Trial Court's 
determination was in error the Trial Court's award of summary 
judgment must be reversed. 
II. 
THE TERMS OF THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS ARE AMBIGUOUS 
Although Plaintiff argues that the lower court's interpreta-
tion of the Indemnity Agreement finds no support in the language 
thereof, this Court need merely find that the language is subject 
to differing interpretations in order to reverse the lower court's 
ruling on summary judgment. See Macaruso v. Republic National 
Bank, 543 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); R & P Enterprises v. 
LaGuarta, Gavrel & Kirk, Inc., 596 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. 1980). 
Had this been a bench trial, the Trial Court would have been 
free to accept one conflicting interpretation over another. 
However, this matter came before the Trial Court on Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Ambiguity in a written instrument is 
sufficient in and of itself to make summary judgment inappropriate. 
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Frisbee v. K & K Construction Co., 676 P.2d 387, 390 (Utah 1984); 
AMJACS Interwest, Inc. v. Design Associates, 635 P.2d 53 (Utah 
1981). The Trial Court sought to avoid the problems created by am-
biguity in the document by ruling that the document itself is 
unambiguous. However, if a contractual provision is reasonably 
subject to differing interpretations, its meaning is a question of 
fact which precludes summary judgment. Kerr Land & Livestock, Inc. 
v. Glaus, 107 Idaho 767, 692 P.2d 1199 (Ct. App. 1984); Dennis v. 
Searle, 457 So.2d 941 (Miss. 1984). In any case where there is any 
doubt about the meaning of a written instrument there arise issues 
of fact to be litigated and summary judgment is inappropriate. 
Weaver v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Wyoming, 609 P.2d 984 (Wyo. 
1980). 
In the instant case, it is clear that the relevant provisions 
of the Indemnity Agreements are subject to conflicting interpreta-
tions . 
The next-to-last sentence of the Indemnity Agreements states: 
The obligation of the party of the first part in 
this agreement shall extend to the mortgage executed by, 
through, or for the party of the first part of assigns 
on the above premises. 
This language is the lynch pin of Defendants' argument. It is not 
an exemplary model of clarity of expression. To say that it is 
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intelligible is generous. To say that it is an expression of the 
parties' intent which is clear and unambiguous is error• 
Courts have used various tests in determining the existence 
of an ambiguity within a document. While expressed differently, 
the central element is the possibility that the document is 
susceptible to conflicting interpretations. See DeLancey v. 
DeLancey, 110 Idaho 63, 714 P.2d 32 (1986); Newman v. Associated 
Systems, 107 Idaho 922, 693 P.2d 1124 (Ct. App. 1985); Ramsey v. 
Sedlar, 75 Wash. 2d 901, 454 P.2d 416 (1969). The Oregon Court of 
Appeals has stated that a "contract term is ambiguous if it has no 
definite significance, or if it is capable of more than one 
sensible and reasonable interpretation." Oakridge Cable Vision 
Inc. v. First Interstate Bank, 65 Or. App. 640, 673 P.2d 532 
(1983). Stated positively, a term is unambiguous if it is so clear 
as to preclude doubt by a reasonable man of its meaning. Western 
Alliance Corp. v. Western Reliance Corp., 57 Or. App. 263, 643 P.2d 
1382 (1982). The Wyoming Supreme Court has held that an ambiguous 
contract is an agreement which is obscure in its meaning because 
of indefiniteness of its expression or because of the presence of 
a double meaning. Farr v. Link, 746 P.2d 431 (Wyo. 1987). 
Measured by any standard, the language relied upon by the Trial 
Court is ambiguous. 
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The language is capable of several reasonable interpretations 
different from the one imposed on it by the Trial Court. A fair 
reading of the above-quoted language would be that the obligation 
of C.C. International (to indemnify Gate City from any mechanics' 
liens as stated in Point I, Supra) shall extend to the above-
mentioned mortgage, meaning that C.C. International's duty to 
indemnify runs not to the owner of the property, but rather to the 
holder of the security interest. This reading of the language 
draws nothing from outside the four corners of the document and is 
in perfect harmony with the language and expressed intent of all 
of the pre-printed sections which precede it. A third interpreta-
tion of this language would be that the obligation of C.C. Interna-
tional contained in this agreement, the "Indemnity Agreement", 
shall run with the land, thus the reference to "of assigns on the 
above premises." Another possible meaning is that C.C. Interna-
tional's duty to indemnify from mechanics' liens extends to the 
mortgage executed by Defendants as assigns of C.C. International. 
These interpretations do not exclude the possibility of still 
different and conflicting interpretations of the language. Any of 
the above readings and interpretations of the critical language is 
as reasonable as the one given by the Trial Court. 
The term "of assigns of the above premises" appears to have 
no definite significance, or is, at best, unclear in its expres-
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sion. One may speculate that the language contained a typo-
graphical error, and attempt to replace one or more of the words 
with a word which fits one's own particular interpretation, as 
Defendants do. Record at 1476 at 27. Or, one may choose to simply 
ignore certain words, phrases, or clauses. However, if one must 
resort to changing or ignoring the language of the Agreement, that 
is a clear indication that the words as written are not clear, 
unambiguous expressions of the parties' intent. Words cannot be 
read into an agreement which impart meaning wholly unexpressed when 
the agreement was executed. Cline v. Angle. 216 Kan. 328, 532 P.2d 
1093 (1975). 
The language used at the beginning of the Indemnity Agreement 
reads as follows: 
Whereas the party of the first part has obtained 
from the party of the second part a first mortgage loan 
for the principal balance of $200,000 on the following 
described property. . . . 
While this particular language may appear unambiguous on its face, 
significant latent ambiguities exist. It is an undisputed fact 
that C.C. International did not obtain loans from Gate City for 
$200,000 on the properties described. 
A statement of fact in the recitals of an agreement which is 
clearly inaccurate gives rise to questions regarding the intent and 
understanding of the parties at the time they entered into the 
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agreement• See Ebert v. Dr. Scholl's Foot Comfort Shops, Inc., 92 
111. Dec. 323, 484 N.E.2d 1178 (1985); Charaois v. Trip-L-Ouik, 
441 So.2d 45 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Griffin Builders Supply, Inc. v. 
Jones, 384 So.2d 265 (Fla. Ct. App. 1980). 
The use of the term "mortgage" in the document also creates 
ambiguity. Mortgage is a term of art describing a method of 
securing an indebtedness. It has particular characteristics set 
forth by statute. Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-8 (1987). It is un-
disputed that there were no mortgages granted by C.C. Interna-
tional, for C.C. International, or on behalf of C.C* International 
with regard to any of the eleven properties which are the subjects 
of this action. The only security devices used on the loans made 
were the Promissory Notes and Trust Deeds executed by Defendants. 
Therefore any references to "mortgages" is inaccurate and creates 
uncertainty in meaning. 
When latent ambiguities exist the Court, of necessity, must 
resort to extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent. See Macaruso 
v. Republic National Bank, 543 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). 
Since the language as written clearly, unequivocally, and undeni-
ably contains inaccurate statements of fact, the Court must look 
outside the document to ascertain the true facts and determine from 
those facts, and the circumstances surrounding the transaction, the 
true intent of the parties. 
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III. 
THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES CREATES AMBIGUITY. 
Defendants argued at the hearing on their Motion for Summary 
Judgment that the Court could rely on the four corners of the 
document without reference to any expressions of the parties' 
intent. Record at 1476 transcript pages 27 and 28. This argument 
is clearly in error. The Court's purpose in reviewing a document 
is to determine the parties' intent. Bennett v. Robinson's Medical 
Mart, Inc. 18 Utah 2d 186, 417 P.2d 761 (Utah 1966). In the 
instant case, Defendants seek to impose their own strained con-
struction on an agreement to which they were not parties in an 
effort to avoid an obligation they voluntarily entered into for 
profit. 
The Trial Court in reviewing a document errs when it ignores 
clear evidence of the parties' intent, even when the language of 
the document seems clear. It is a universally recognized principle 
of law that, where an instrument, such as deed, absolute on its 
face and unambiguous in its terms, was intended by the parties to 
provide security rather than to transfer title, the Court will 
allow parole evidence of the parties' intent and construe the 
instrument accordingly. The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held 
that when all parties to a writing understood, intended and treated 
it as something inconsistent with its express terms, that creates 
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an ambiguity that must be resolved by parol evidence of the 
parties' intent. Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 558 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976); 
Hansen v. Kohler, 550 P.2d 186 (Utah 1976); Taylor v. Turner, 27 
Utah 2d 39, 492 P.2d 1343 (1972); Gibbons v. Gibbons, 103 Utah 266, 
135 P.2d 105 (1943); Thornley Land and Livestock Company v. Gailey, 
105 Utah 519, 143 P.2d 283 (1943). 
In such cases, where the Trial Court has refused to consider 
extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent, but determined intent 
solely on the basis of the express language of the documents, the 
Supreme Court has reversed stating: "Documentary evidence is not 
dispositive if the intent and purpose underlying the documents are 
at issue." W.M. Barnes Company v. Sohio Natural Resources Co., 
627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981). In Sohio, the Trial Court awarded summary 
judgment based on documents that were admittedly absolute and 
unambiguous in their terms. The Supreme Court reversed stating 
that a question of material fact remained regarding the parties' 
intent, because the parties' purpose, intent and understanding in 
executing the documents was contrary to their express language. 
In Colonial Leasing Company v. Larsen Brothers Construction, 
731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court extended and 
affirmed this rule of construction, recognizing that "ambiguity" 
requiring parol evidence of intent may arise despite the otherwise 
unambiguous language of an agreement. 
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It is the general rule that if an agreement is 
ambiguous because of lack of clarity in the 
meaning of particular terms, it is subject to 
parole evidence as to what the parties intended 
with respect to those terms. We hold that the 
rule also applies where the character of the 
written agreement itself is ambiguous even 
though its specific terms are not ambiguous. 
Id. (Citations omitted) (Emphasis added). 
An ambiguity or dispute regarding the "character" of an 
agreement, turns on the intent, understanding and expectations of 
the parties concerning the nature, purpose and effect of the 
agreement as opposed to the interpretation or clarity of a specific 
term or clause thereof. Whether this ambiguity of "character" 
involves a deed/mortgage as in Barnes v. Sohio, supra, a sale/lease 
agreement as in Colonial, or an indemnity agreement/assumption as 
in the instant case, the relevant issue is not the clarity of the 
language of the agreement per se, but the underlying understanding 
of the parties concerning its nature, purpose and effect on the 
parties' rights and obligations. Resort simply to the express 
language of the document cannot resolve that ambiguity, since it 
arises from the intentions, understanding and expectations of the 
parties inconsistent with the document's language. 
This rule of law was also recognized in Builough v. Sims, 16 
Utah 2d 304, 400 P.2d 20 (1965). The Bui lough Court explained that 
even if the express language of a contract, standing alone, would 
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mean one thing to the Court, where the parties demonstrated that 
they understood it to mean something else, the meaning and the 
intent of the parties should be enforced. 
Here the contracting parties demonstrated by 
their actions that they knew what the words 
meant and were intended to mean. Thus, even 
if it be assumed that the words standing alone 
might mean one thing to the members of this 
Court, where the parties have demonstrated by 
their actions and performance that to them the 
contract meant something quite different, the 
meaning and intent of the parties should be 
enforced. In such a situation the parties, by 
their actions, have created the "ambiguity7 
required to bring the rule into operation. If 
this were not the rule, the Courts would be 
enforcing one contract when both parties have 
demonstrated that they meant and intended the 
contract to be quite different. [Emphasis 
added]. 
The rationale for this rule is very basic. The Court's 
primary objective in viewing a document purported to be an agree-
ment between two parties is to ascertain the intent of the parties 
in entering the agreement. Verhoef v. Aston, 740 P.2d 1342 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987). The Court must do more than simply determine the 
language of the agreement and its legal implications; it must also 
determine the mutual understanding of the parties, for there can 
be no agreement absent mutual understanding and assent. Cargill 
v. Sherrod, 96 N.M. 431, 631 P.2d 726 (1981). 
The intent, understanding and expectation of the parties to 
the Indemnity Agreement is demonstrated by the numerous statements 
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and actions of C.C. International, and its owner and president, 
Vaughn Cook, and Gate City Mortgage Company, Certain of those 
statements and actions include: 
1. Vaughn Cook stated in his affidavit, filed in opposition 
to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, that neither he nor 
C.C. International intended to assume the loan obligations of the 
Defendants; applied or otherwise requested to assume those loan 
obligations; nor understood or considered that they had assumed 
those loan obligations. Record at 851. 
2. At the time of closing on each of the subject loans, Mr. 
Cook advised the Defendants that they would remain liable on the 
obligations until they were assumed by Kilburn Vacation Homeshare, 
Inc., a corporation owned by James Clark, and that such assumption 
would occur sometime after the closing on the loan obligations. 
(Deposition of Vaughn Cook of 11-21-88 at pp. 83, 165). 
3. At the time of the closings on the subject loans, Mr. 
Cook presented to the Defendants an agreement entitled "Assumption 
Agreement" to be executed by the Defendants, and to be executed 
subsequently by Kilburn Vacation Homeshares, Inc., whereby Kilburn 
Vacation Homeshares, Inc. would agree to assume the loan obliga-
tions of the Defendants. Those Assumption Agreements, executed by 
each of the Defendants, specifically provide that the Defendants 
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would not be released from ongoing liability to Plaintiff on the 
subject loan obligations. Record at 855. 
4. In August of 1982, nearly nine months after execution of 
the Indemnity Agreements, Vaughn Cook sent a letter to Defendant 
Michael Johnson, a copy of which is attached to the Second Af-
fidavit of Vaughn Cook Record at 1003 (Appendix "E"), requesting 
that Mr. Johnson execute the aforesaid "Assumption Agreement." 
5. In June of 1984, Vaughn Cook sent a letter to Gate City 
Mortgage Company, a copy of which is attached to the Second 
Affidavit of Vaughn Cook Record at 1003 (Appendix "E"), stating 
that the loan obligations of the Defendants were to be assumed by 
Kilburn Vacation Homeshares, Inc., but that the assumption had 
never occurred. 
6. Several of the Defendants received letters from Vaughn 
Cook advising them that Kilburn was the party responsible for 
assuming the loan obligations and/or providing Defendants with 
guarantees of that fact. Record at 1395, (And are also identified 
by the Defendants in certain of their depositions. John Eyre 
Deposition at 51-53; Ray Fisher Deposition at 25-27; John C. 
Forrester, III Deposition at 33-36; Christian E. Hansen Deposition 
at 96-98; David E. Jones Deposition at 50-51; Daniel W. Marcum 
Deposition at 27; Marvin LeRoy Mills Deposition at 59-60; and 
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Thomas G. Osborne Deposition at 39.) Those letters and guarantees 
are attached hereto as Appendix "H." 
7. In his deposition, Vaughn Cook stated that his under-
standing of the nature, purpose, and effect of the Indemnity 
Agreements was that they would indemnify Gate City Mortgage Company 
from mechanics' liens on the properties securing the loan obliga-
tions. (Deposition of Vaughn Cook of 12-6-88 at 305). 
8. Stephen Blazer, the Defendant whose Indemnity Agreement 
was attached to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
on which the Court based its Ruling, testified that Vaughn Cook 
told him that the subject Indemnity Agreement covering his lot in 
Jeremy Ranch did not act as an assumption of his loan obligation 
to Gate City, or release him from his liability to Gate City. 
Kilburn Vacation Homeshares, Inc. was to assume the obligation. 
(Deposition of Stephen Blazer at Page 117 - 129). 
9. Gate City Mortgage Company, through the Affidavit of 
Blaise Johnson, its officer, stated that it never agreed, nor 
intended to agree to permit Vaughn Cook or his company C.C. 
International, to assume the subject loan obligations, nor did 
Vaughn Cook or C.C. International ever apply to assume such loan 
obligations. Gate City's intent and understanding in executing the 
Indemnity Agreement was that C.C. International, would indemnify 
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Gate City from any mechanics' liens filed on the properties 
securing the subject loans. Record at 958. 
10. When the loans went into default in the spring of 1984, 
Gate City recorded Notices of Default reflecting that the Defen-
dants were in default on the loans and demanding that they cure any 
default. Copies of those notices to the Defendants were sent to 
them at the addresses specified in the subject Trust Deeds. Record 
at 577. 
11. Gate City never prepared, recorded or mailed notices of 
default reflecting that C.C. International had defaulted on any 
obligation it had with respect to the subject loans, or demanding 
that it cure such defaults. Record at 577. 
12. Gate City commenced the eleven actions consolidated in 
the above-captioned matter against each of the Defendants on their 
subject loan obligations. Vaughn Cook and C.C. International were 
not named as Defendants in those actions, nor has any deficiency 
action been brought against them by Gate City on those loan 
obligations. Record at 550. 
The actions and statements of the parties to the Indemnity 
Agreement, C.C. International, and Gate City, clearly demonstrate 
that neither party intended the Indemnity Agreement to do anything 
more than to indemnify Gate City for mechanics liens. Nothing in 
the conduct of the parties can be construed to support the trial 
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court's reading of the Indemnity Agreement as an assumption 
agreement* The Court cannot ignore the express intent of the 
parties in entering into the Assumption Agreement, even if it finds 
that the language of that document is clear. W. M. Barnes v. 
Sohio, supra, Bullouqh, supra. The express intent of the parties 
in entering into the Indemnity Agreement is in direct conflict with 
the interpretation the Court has placed on that document. This 
creates an ambiguity which precludes summary judgment as a matter 
of law. 
IV. 
DEFENDANTS' ACTIONS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THEIR ARGUMENT.. 
The actions of the Defendants are inconsistent with their 
argument that the Indemnity Agreement constituted "assumptions", 
and unequivocally support the position of Gate City that the 
Indemnity Agreements were not agreements of assumption. 
A. Following Execution of the Indemnity Agreements. the 
Defendants Executed Uniform Real Estate Contracts. 
The Real Estate Contracts each provide in paragraph 3 thereof, 
that "buyer [C. C. International] agrees to take property subject 
to the first mortgage to Gate City mortgage . . . and to assume 
[future tense] or cause the same to be assumed by any subsequent 
buyer." (Emphasis added). Just below the signature line on each 
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Real Estate Contract, a separate hand-typed paragraph is inserted 
which states: 
It is understood that at such time as the 
underlying mortgage is assumed [future tense] 
by buyer or its assigns then this contract 
shall be deemed fully executed and paid. 
(Emphasis added). 
The Real Estate Contracts expressly state that C. C. Interna-
tional thereby purchases the properties from the Defendants subject 
to the mortgage loan obligations. 
"Subject to" is a term of art that means that an existing 
mortgage obligation is not assumed by the purchaser of the encum-
bered property. See, e.g. , Snidow v. Hill, 197 P.2d 801 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1948), in which the Court stated: 
On the contrary [appellants] agreed to buy the 
land "subject to" the deed of trust. Even 
assximing that the transfer of the property 
pursuant to the agreement was subject to the 
trust deed, it does not follow that appellants 
by the agreement thereby assumed to perform all 
the obligations of the trust deed. A mere 
grant of the property subject to a mortgage 
debt is not sufficient to impose any personal 
liability on the grantee to pay the debt or 
perform any of the obligations thereof. To 
effect such obligation, there must be a dis-
tinct assumption of the debt or of the contrac-
tual obligations thereunder. 
Id. at 803 (citations omitted). See also Fluke Capital & Manage-
ment Services Co. v. Richmond, 106 Wash. 2d 614, 724 P.2d 356 
(1986). 
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In this case, the purchaser C. C. International expressly was 
not assuming the loan obligations when it purchased the Defendants' 
properties. It purchased them "subject to" the obligations. If 
C. C. International had assumed the Defendants' loan obligations 
through the Indemnity Agreements prior to entering into the Real 
Estate Contracts, the contracts would not provide that the proper-
ties were purchased "subject to" those obligations. Likewise, the 
contracts themselves would be unnecessary, since the contracts were 
to be deemed "paid" at the time that the purchaser assumed Defen-
dants' liability to repay the Promissory Note. 
Moreover, the hand-typed paragraph below the signature lines 
reflects that an assumption had not yet occurred: ". . .at such 
time as the underlying mortgage is assumed . . . ." That paragraph 
is absolutely unnecessary if an assumption had previously occurred, 
but was carefully added by hand to each Real Estate Contract. This 
is compelling evidence that the prior execution of the Indemnity 
Agreement did not constitute an assumption, and should be viewed 
as evidence of C.C. International's intent in interpreting the 
Indemnity Agreement. 
B. Defendants Never Expected or Intended C.C. International 
to Assume Their Obligations. 
Virtually every Defendant testified that he understood that 
Kilburn was the party that would assume the loan obligations, and 
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that the Defendants remained liable until that assumption occurred. 
See, e.g., Oral Jay Call Deposition at 40-41; Kenneth P. Colledge 
Deposition at 66-67; Edward A. Dalton Deposition at 62-63; R. John 
Eyre Deposition at 49-51, 54, 56; Ray Fisher Deposition at 81; John 
C. Forrester, III Deposition at 28-29; Christian E. Hansen Deposi-
tion at 20-22; David E. Jones Deposition at 46-48; Jedd P. Jones 
Deposition at 16-18; Daniel W. Marcum Deposition at 22; Marvin 
LeRoy Mills Deposition at 32; Clive A. Pusev Deposition at 31-32, 
52-53; W. Truman Rigby Deposition at 35; Donald L. Smith Deposition 
at 121-122; Charles Marden Spencer Deposition at 26. 
Moreover, the Defendants executed, concurrent with the 
execution of the Uniform Real Estate Contracts and subsequent to 
execution of the Indemnity Agreements, formal written Assumption 
Agreements providing that Kilburn Vacation Homeshares, Inc., not 
C.C. International, was to assume the loan obligations, and 
acknowledging that they were not released from ongoing liability 
to Gate City. (See Appendix "G"). Pertinent portions of the 
Assumption Agreements state as follows: 
ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT made on the date hereinafter set 
forth opposite the signatures of vendor and 
purchaser, by and between [names of applicable 
Defendants] hereinafter called Vendors, and 
Kilburn Vacation Homeshares, Inc. hereinafter 
called Purchasers, of property located at 
[description of the applicable property in the 
Jeremy Ranch subdivision] . . . 
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Purchasers rKilburn Vacation Homeshares, Inc . 1 
assume and agree to pay said Note as therein 
provided, and further to assume all the obliga-
tions of said mortgage as therein provided, and 
to perform in accordance with the covenants and 
conditions thereof. 
It is understood that Mortgagee fGate City] 
does not release Vendor or Vendors [the Defen-
dants! from further liability under or on 
account of the said Note and Mortgage. . . . 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this instrument has been 
executed by the parties hereto on the date set 
forth opposite their names. 
DATED I si [Defendants] 
VENDOR 
I si rDefendants') 
VENDOR 
DATED KILBURN VACATION HOMESHARES, INC. 
PURCHASER 
By: Is/ 
JAMES M. CLARK 
(Emphasis added). 
By executing those Assumption Agreements each Defendant agreed 
that Kilburn Vacation Homeshares, Inc. was the party that was to 
assume the loan obligations, and further agreed that he was not 
released from liability to Gate City on the loans pursuant to the 
assumption. 
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The formal written assumption agreements are consistent with 
Defendants' statements that the loan obligations were to be assumed 
by Kilburn Vacation Homeshares, Inc., not C.C. International or 
Vaughn Cook, and are directly inconsistent with every argument and 
assertion advanced by the Defendants in their Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
V. 
NOVATION MUST BE INTENDED BY THE PARTIES. 
The effect of the Court's ruling was that the Indemnity Agree-
ment was an assumption and release which constitutes a novation. 
It is well-settled contract law that "[t]he essential element of 
a novation is the discharge of one of the parties to a contract and 
the acceptance of a new performer by the other party as a sub-
stitute for the first original party." First American Commerce Co. 
v. Washington Mutual Savings Bank, 743 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1987); 
Kennedy v. Griffith, 98 Utah 183, 187, 95 P2.d 752 (1939). 
Significantly, a novation must be intended by the original 
contracting parties, and whether an agreement is a novation is a 
matter of intent to be determined by a trier of fact and not a 
question of law. First American, 743 P.2d at 1195. See also 
Horman v. Gordon, 740 P.2d 1346 (Utah App. 1987) ("intent of the 
parties to cause a novation cannot be presumed but must be clear.") 
This rule and its rationale are especially applicable to 
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agreements of assumption because such agreements are not favored 
or presumed in the law. An agreement to assume the obligations of 
another can arise only when the party so charged affirmatively 
undertakes that obligation. A. Stearns, Suretyship § 3.6 (5th ed. 
1981). Such a relationship is consensual and contractual and 
requires mutual assent to its terms. National Bank of Washington 
v. Equity Investors, 86 Wash. 2d 545, 546 P.2d 440 (1976). Indeed, 
the construction against assumption agreements is so compelling 
that the transferee of land subject to a mortgage will not be held 
to have assumed the mortgage obligation absent clear and convincing 
proof of assumption. Fluke Capital & Management Services Co. v. 
Richmond. 106 Wash. 2d 614, 724 P.2d 356, 362 (1986). 
The finding of a novation by the Trial Court required a 
finding of intent on the part of C.C. International to assume over 
$2,000,000 in liabilities. The clearest statement of intent is the 
affidavit of Vaughn Cook, President of C.C. International, which 
states he never assumed or even applied to assume the obligation. 
Defendants argue this "intent" to assume is evidenced by the 
ambiguous language of the Indemnity Agreements. However, con-
spicuously absent from any language contained in the Indemnity 
Agreements, is: 
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1. The word assume, assumption, or any derivative thereof, 
either in the title of the document or in its substantive pro-
visions; 
2. A reference that C.C. International will pay or cause to 
be paid the loan obligations of the Defendants; 
3. A reference that C.C. International is liable, respon-
sible, or answerable for the loan obligations; 
4. A reference that C.C. International will indemnify the 
Defendants from any liability arising from a default in connection 
with the loan obligations; or, 
5. Any other words or phrases reflecting an assumption of 
the loan obligations. 
Likewise, the clearest expression of Gate City's intent in 
entering into the Indemnity Agreement is the affidavit of Blaise 
Johnson, on behalf of Gate City, that Gate City never intended by 
the Indemnity Agreement to accept C.C. International as the obligor 
on the loans nor did it intend to release the Defendants from 
liability. Record at 576. 
Defendants argued on Summary Judgment that the acceptance of 
payments by Gate City from third parties was evidence of their 
intent to release borrower from liability. However: "[A] credit-
or's mere acceptance of the obligation of a third person without 
an agreement or intention to release the original debtor or 
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extinguish the original debt does not amount to a novation." D.A. 
Taylor Co. v. Paulson, 552 P.2d 1274, (Utah 1976); Kennedy v. 
Griffith, 98 Utah 183, 95 P.2d 752 (1939). 
The primary purpose in construction of a contract is to 
determine the parties' intent. Dubois v. Nye, 584 P.2d 823 (Utah 
1978). In the instant case, both parties to the Indemnity Agree-
ment state that they never intended or understood the agreement to 
be an assumption agreement, and never considered or treated it as 
such. (Affidavits of Vaughn Cook and Blaise Johnson filed in 
opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Record at 
850, 958.) 
The clear expression of intent by the parties to the Indemnity 
Agreement, Gate City and C.C. International, was that it was not 
intended as an assumption. The finding by the Trial Court to the 
contrary required a determination of a disputed material fact which 
was not appropriate on Summary Judgment. 
VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY MADE FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS. 
It is impossible to accept the Indemnity Agreement as an 
"assumption agreement," or to even consider the possibility that 
it might be construed as such without giving Defendants the full 
advantage of every assertion of fact in their Memorandum. In 
reviewing the Motion for Summary Judgment the opposite standard 
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must be applied. All facts, and inferences to be drawn from those 
facts, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the parties 
resisting the motion. Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Insurance Co., 714 
P.2d 648 (Utah 1986); Brandt v. Springville Banking Co., 10 Utah 
2d 350, 353 P.2d 460 (1960). Any doubt should be resolved in favor 
of denying the motion to allow the parties to fully present their 
arguments at trial. See Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 
P.2d 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis National Bank, 
737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). 
The Trial Court could not have applied this standard in 
reaching a decision in this case. The following facts and inferen-
ces, viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, would 
present factual issues which would have precluded summary judgment. 
In order to rule as it did the Trial Court had to make factual 
findings that executed Indemnity Agreements existed for each of the 
eleven transactions. Defendants have failed to produce the 
critical documents for two of the eleven transactions. Without 
such Indemnity Agreements, Defendants' arguments must fail. A 
determination that an executed Indemnity Agreement existed in cases 
where none were produced by Defendants is a determination of fact. 
This determination was made based upon circumstantial evidence 
presented to the Trial Court. While the Court may rely on cir-
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cumstantial evidence to determine a fact at trial, to do so on a 
motion for summary judgment is clearly error. 
In order to find a release of liability under section 17 of 
the Trust Deed it is necessary to determine that Plaintiff had 
waived the right to accelerate. This determination is a factual 
one. Becovic v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 128 111. App. 3d 107, 
469 N.E.2d 1379 (1984); See also The Bowery Savings Bank v. 
Jenkins, 30 Utah 2d 232, 516 P.2d 178 (1973). Therefore, the Trial 
Court could not have ruled as it did without, of necessity, making 
determinations of fact. Such factual determinations are improper 
on summary judgment. 
VII. 
THE OPERATIVE DOCUMENTS DO NOT SATISFY 
THE REQUIREMENTS OF A RELEASE 
Even if the subject Indemnity Agreements are unambiguous 
assumptions of the Defendants' loan obligations, which Plaintiff 
vigorously denies, the Defendants still are not released from 
liability. 
The clear and unambiguous language of the subject Trust Deeds 
and Trust Deed Notes expressly provides that the Defendants are not 
released from liability unless two requirements are satisfied in 
writing; 
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1. There must be a written assumption of the subject 
mortgage loan obligations, and 
2. There must be a written agreement whereby Gate City 
accepts the credit of the assuming party, and fixes the 
interest rate for which that party will be responsible. 
These requirements are set forth in paragraph 17 of the subject 
Trust Deeds, and paragraph 10 of the subject Trust Deed Notes 
(which quotes paragraph 17 of the Trust Deed verbatim): 
Transfer of the Property; Assumption. If all or any 
part of the Property or an interest therein is sold or 
transferred by Borrower without Lender's prior written 
consent, excluding (a) creation of a lien or encumbrance 
subordinate to this Deed of Trust, (b) the creation of 
a purchase money security interest for household applian-
ces, (c) a transfer by devise, descent or by operation 
of law upon the death of a joint tenant or (d) the grant 
of any leasehold interest of three years or less not 
containing an option to purchase, Lender may, at Lender's 
option, declare all the sums secured by this Deed of 
Trust to be immediately due and payable. Lender shall 
have waived such option to accelerate if, prior to the 
sale or transfer, Lender and the person to whom the 
Property is to be sold or transferred reach agreement in 
writing that the credit of such person is satisfactory 
to Lender and that the interest payable on the sums 
secured by this Deed of Trust shall be at such rate as 
Lender shall request. If Lender has waived the option 
to accelerate provided in this paragraph 17, and if 
Borrower's successor in interest has executed a written 
assumption agreement accepted in writing by Lender, 
Lender shall release Borrower from all obligations under 
this Deed of Trust and the Note. 
(Emphasis added) 
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Under the express language of paragraph 17, the execution of 
an assumption agreement does not release the Defendants from 
liability unless there is also a waiver of the option to acceler-
ate. The aforesaid provision carefully states that a waiver does 
not occur unless "prior to the sale or transfer [of the property], 
Lender, and the person to whom the property is to be sold or 
transferred reach an agreement in writing that the credit of such 
person is satisfactory to Lender and that the interest payable on 
the sums secured by this Deed of Trust shall be at such rate as 
lender shall request." This written waiver agreement must be 
reached prior to any transfer of the property securing the obliga-
tion. 
The subject Indemnity Agreements do not, and cannot, satisfy 
those written waiver requirements. Nowhere do those agreements 
state, provide or reflect that Gate City has accepted the credit 
of C.C. International. Nowhere do they fix the interest rate to 
be charged. 
The Defendants have not identified or referred to any document 
that satisfies the specific written waiver requirements. They 
merely argue that the Plaintiff's forbearance constituted a waiver. 
That argument fails as a matter of law for three reasons. First, 
any such waiver by forbearance did not occur prior to the transfer 
of the subject properties, which were transferred immediately after 
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the closing on the subject mortgage loans. It could not have 
occurred after the transfer and the subsequent failure to accel-
erate the obligation, because prior to the property transfer 
Plaintiff had no right to accelerate. 
Second, the express, unambiguous language of the subject Trust 
Deeds specifically states that forbearance does not constitute a 
waiver of the right to accelerate. 
11. Forbearance by Lender Not a Waiver. Any 
forbearance by Lender in exercising any right or remedy 
hereunder, or otherwise, afforded by applicable law, 
shall not be a waiver of or preclude the exercise of any 
such right or remedy. 
Hence, there could not be a waiver except by written agreement as 
set forth in paragraph 17 of the subject Trust Deeds and paragraph 
10 of the subject Trust Deed Notes. 
Third, even if forbearance could constitute a waiver under the 
express language of the operative documents, whether a waiver 
occurred is a factual question reserved for the jury. Becovic v. 
Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 128 111. App. 3d 107, 469 N.E.2d 1379 
(1984), See The Bowery Savings Bank v. Jenkins, 30 Utah 2d 232, 
516 P.2d 178 (1973). That alone precludes summary judgment. 
As provided by the express language of the subject Trust Deed 
Notes and Trust deeds, waiver occurs only through the execution of 
a written agreement accepting the credit of the assuming party and 
fixing the interest rate the lender requires. That never occurred. 
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Absent such a written waiverf the Defendants are not released from 
liability. Therefore, under the clear, unambiguous language of 
those operative documents, even if an assumption occurred, the 
Defendants remain liable on their loan obligations. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-15-8 (1986) outlines the procedure that 
must be followed in order to affect an assumption. That section 
requires the borrower to provide a written notice and request for 
assumption to the lender. The lender at its option may approve or 
deny the assumption, and may refuse to release the original 
borrower from liability. 
In the instant case this procedure was not followed. No 
written application was made by the borrowers to have C.C. 
International assume their liability. The Indemnity Agreements do 
not constitute such. Defendants have failed to effect an assump-
tion as required by statute and failed to obtain a written waiver 
of the right to accelerate pursuant to Section 17 of the Trust 
Deed. Therefore, the Trial Court erred in finding that the 
requirements for a release had been met. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants' argument hinges on an interpretation of obscure 
language contained in agreements which they were not parties to. 
Defendants' interpretation of that language is inconsistent with 
the remaining clear and unambiguous language of those agreements. 
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It is inconsistent with the intent of the parties to the agreements 
as expressed by the language of the agreements, the actions of the 
parties and their affidavits concerning their intent. 
The Trial Court erred in adopting Defendants' interpretation 
of this language and by ruling that such language was clear and 
unambiguous when there are both patent and latent ambiguities in 
the language of the documents. The Court also improperly ignored 
all other evidence of the parties' intent. Even if the language 
were unambiguous, the Court was not asked simply to interpret that 
document, but to determine whether, given all relevant evidence, 
there were any material issues of fact regarding whether all of the 
elements necessary for a release had occurred. 
There were questions of fact regarding the intent of the 
parties, not just their intent in entering into the Indemnity 
Agreements, but their intent in executing the other relevant 
documents. Whether Plaintiff waived its right to accelerate is a 
question of fact completely independent of the Court's interpreta-
tion of the Indemnity Agreements. Wherefore, not only is the Trial 
Court's interpretation of the Indemnity Agreements wrong, as a 
matter of law, but the Trial Court's ruling granting summary 
judgment is improper since there exist questions of fact which 
cannot be resolved by interpretation of the Indemnity Agreements. 
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In reviewing summary judgment this Court must view all facts 
and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
Plaintiff's claims; in so doing, this Court need not give deference 
to the ruling of the Trial Court, but must simply determine if 
summary judgment was appropriate as a matter of law. Plaintiff 
asserts that summary judgment was inappropriate and respectfully 
requests that the ruling of the Trial Court be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this c?*! day of October, 1989. 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
CLAlQC W. SESSIONS ' 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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ROY B. MOORE (2308) 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
400 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 359-4100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GATE CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DANIEL W. MARCUM; DR. EDWARD A. 
DALTON, JR.; MICHAEL C. 
JOHNSON; JOHN C. FORRESTER, 
JR.; MCB CO.; GOOD TIMESHARE; 
LARRY J. HERCULES and AMIR 
VITRAMI d/b/a GALLERIA TIME-
SHARE; JACK T. BROOKSHIRE and 
LINDA A. BROOKSHIRE d/b/a JT & 
LA HOMESHARE; STEPHEN C. 
PECORARO and JUDY DUPRE PECORARO 
d/b/a DUPEC ENTERPRISES; L.O. 
DENNY and ELIZABETH A. DENNY 
d/b/a DENNY'S TIMESHARE; JERRY 
T. PAUL and MARGARET E. PAUL 
d/b/a PAUL AND PAUL INVESTMENTS; 
ROBERT H. OLIVER and NORA R. 
OLIVER d/b/a OLIVER TIMESHARE; 
MORRIS J. DUPRE and BILLYE 
LOUISE DUPRE d/b/a N.J. DUPRE 
ENTERPRISES; RONALD L. LEE and 
ARDIS F. LEE d/b/a LEES SKI; 
FRED KEATON and GLORIA KEATON 
d/b/a KEATON AND KEATON; THOMAS 
BAUER and DONNA M. BAUER d/b/a 
THE BAUER PARTNERSHIP; ROBERT D. 
RAFFERTY and DORALIE A. RAFFERTY 
d/b/a ROKENKAR ENTERPRISES; 
TOMMY F. KEATON and PATRICIA L. 
KEATON d/b/a ROE LAND TIMESHARE; 
VICTOR F. PETRUZZELLI and MURIEL 
B. PETRUZZELLI d/b/a CASA 
PETRUZZELLI TIMESHARE; AUSSIE 
PARTNERSHIP; NOLAND & SONS; 
PAUL D. WILSON and BEVERLY 
WILSON d/b/a DOUBLE ODDS 
TIMESHARE;' KELLY B. DEINES and 
TIMESHARE; JOHN A. MCFARLANE 
and JANET L. MCFARLANE d/b/a 
MCFARLANE TIMESHARE; CHARLES W. 
CALHOUN and SHIRLEY S. CALHOUN 
d/b/a CHA-SHIR; TED M. CADMAN 
and BRYCE K. HOMER d/b/a CADMAN 
& ASSOCIATES; WALTER J. PETERS 
and JEANNETE E. PETERS d/b/a 
WJJP TIMESHARE; JANICE C. 
WILLIAMSON and KEITH N. 
SHELLHAMMER d/b/a KE-JAN 
HOMESHARE; DARREL R. 
NAUSASCHASER and CAROL J. 
NAUSASCHASER d/b/a STORK 
INVESTMENTS; E. KEITH COFFIN 
and FRANK H. RODKEY d/b/a 
COFFIN AND RODKEY HOMESHARE; 
ROBERT C. GORDON and JOSEPHINE 
PICKARD d/b/a GOODIE TWO SHOES 
TIMESHARE; W. R. HEARSHMAN and 
GLORIA M. HEARSHMAN d/b/a B & G 
GETAWAYS; JAMES B. PHILLIPS and 
JOAN K. PHILLIPS d/b/a J & J • 
PHILLIPS ENTERPISES; HAROLD E. 
WHITELEY and JOAN C. WHITELEY 
d/b/a JOHAL TIMESHARE; EDISON 
P. JANNEY and MAUREEN A. 
JANNEY d/b/a WINGMAN 
CORPORATION; DENTON LYNN DUNN, 
DENTON LEE DUNN, DALE O. 
CHRISTENSEN, GLEN R. PENROSE 
and HOWARD RONALD STONE d/b/a 
DUNN PETROLEUM HOMESHARE; 
HOMESHARE GENERAL OWNERS 
ASSOCIATION; JOHN DOES 1-50 
and JOHN DOES 51-75, 
Defendants. 
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T > / * > V T % T A -HT i-s-n T » T r » n 
ROY B. MOORE (2308) 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
400 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 359-4100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GATE CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GRAHAM DODD; DWIGHT H. EGAN; 
MCB CO.; BILLY R. BRAZIL and 
BILLIE J. BRAZIL d/b/a BRAZIL 
INVESTMENTS; DIVERSIFIED 
INVESTORS; GUY H. LANEY and 
BETTY J. LANEY d/b/a LANEY 
PROPERTIES; JOSEPH P. SMITH and 
LYNN E. SMITH d/b/a JOSEPH & 
LYNN SMITH CO.; LARRY STRICKER 
and NEMA STRICKER d/b/a WALDO'S 
LADY; DAVID B. MCKINNON and R. 
D. HALL d/b/a MHK ASSOCIATES; 
DENNIS V. KIDA and KELLEY ANN 
KIDA d/b/a KIDA & ASSOCIATES; 
LAWRENCE J. BIDERMAN and 
SHARON M. BIDERMAN d/b/a BTW 
LIMITED; JOHN E. BUCHER and 
CHARLOTTE BUCHER d/b/a NOSAM 
AND REHCUB; DENTON LYNN DUNN, 
DENTON LEE DUNN, DALE O. 
CHRISTENSEN, GLEN R. PENROSE 
and HOWARD RONALD STONE d/b/a 
DUNN PETROLEUM HOMESHARES; 
HOMESHARE GENERAL OWNERS 
ASSOCIATION; CAPITOL THRIFT & 
LOAN; JOHN DOES 1-50 and JOHN 
DOES 51-75, 
Civil No. 8075 
Defendants. 
ROY B. MOORE (2308) 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
400 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 359-4100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GATE CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHRISTIAN E. HANSON; DAVID E. 
JONES; MCB CO.; FOREVER LIVING 
PRODUCTS, INC. d/b/a FOREVER 
LIVING PRODUCTS; R. JOHN EYRE, 
STEVEN JOHN EYRE and SIDNEY R. 
HARMON d/b/a CAREFREE; EDWARD 
B. HALDEMAN and KENNETH A. 
MILLER d/b/a KILLARNEY; EUGENE 
ISAAK and M. J. SEBY d/b/a 
BLUE SPRUCE PROPERTIES; ROBERT 
A. DOWER and KATHLEEN K. KOWER 
d/b/a R. & K. DOWER 
ENTERPRISES; C & L DEVELOPMENT, 
INC. and CARYL M. LIBHART 
d/b/a BILCO PROPERTIES; 
WINSTON L.E. EDMONDSON and 
LOUISE A. EDMONDSON d/b/a 
EDMONDSON & EDMONDSON 
INVESTMENT COMPANY; ORVIN F. 
BAKER and VIRGINIA A. BAKER 
d/b/a V & O PARTNERSHIP; 
CARLISLE F. GRIFFIN and 
WILLIAM O. FOSTER d/b/a 
GRIFFIN UTAH PROPERTIES; 
DENTON LYNN DUNN, DENTON LEE 
DUNN, DALE O. CHRISTENSEN, 
GLEN R. PENROSE and HOWARD 
RONALD STONE d/b/a DUNN 
PETROLEUM HOMESHARE; HOMESHARE 
GENERAL OWNERS ASSOCIATION; 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK; 
JOHN DOES 1-50 and JOHN DOES 
51-75, 
Civil No. 8076 
Defendants. 
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SESSIONS & MOORE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
400 First Federal Plaza 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 359-4100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GATE CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MATHEW R. WHITE; MCB CO.; 
DENTON LYNN DUNN, DENTON LEE 
DUNN, DALE O. CHRISTENSEN, 
GLEN R. PENROSE and HOWARD 
RONALD STONE d/b/a DUNN 
PETROLEUM HOMESHARE; HOMESHARE 
GENERAL OWNERS ASSOCIATION; 
JOHN DOES 1-50 and JOHN DOES 
51-75, 
Civil No. 8077 
Defendants. 
ROY B. MOORE (2308) 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
400 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 359-4100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GATE CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
R. JOHN EYRE; MCB CO.; THE 
JEREMY LTD., a Utah limited 
partnership; CHRISTINE E. HYNES 
and K. M. HYNES d/b/a CEH & KMH 
PARTNERSHIP; LARRY M. BRUNER and 
KAREN R. BRUNER d/b/a BRUNER 
ENTERPRISES; HOWARD R. BOOK and 
LEE ANN BOOK d/b/a SONG BIRD 
VACATIONS; JAMES R. SIMMONS and 
LORNA M. SIMMONS d/b/a WASCLO; 
KERMIT K. TAYLOR and FLORA B. 
TAYLOR d/b/a KKT/FBT 
PARTNERSHIP; DANIEL J. REDECKI 
and CLARE G. REDECKI d/b/a 
RADECKI INVESTMENT COMPANY; 
MILES D. HOBBS and LENORA R. 
HOBBS d/b/a MAH/LRH PARTNERSHIP; 
CHARLES M. BERGSCHNEIDER and 
RICHARD J. ALTHOFF d/b/a 
WAVERLY TIMESHARE; CARMINE J. 
COLADONATO and BETTY J. 
COLADONATO d/b/a C. J. & BETTY 
COLADONATO; H. E. CHAMBERS and 
MAXINE T. CHAMBERS d/b/a H. E. 
& MAXINE T. CHAMBERS; DENTON 
LYNN DUNN, DENTON LEE DUNN, 
DALE O. CHRISTENSEN, GLEN R. 
PENROSE and HOWARD RONALD 
STONE d/b/a DUNN PETROLEUM 
HOMESHARE; HOMESHARE GENERAL 
OWNERS ASSOCIATION; RICHARD 
L. SORENSEN; JOHN DOES 1-50 
and JOHN DOES 51-75, 
Civil No. 8078 
Defendants. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GATE CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KELVYN H. CULLIMORE; THOMAS G. 
OSBORNE; W. TRUMAN RIGBY; MCB 
CO.; AUSSIE PARTNERSHIP; DAVID 
M. SIBLEY, PAM S. SIBLEY and 
JOSEPH B. BERKE d/b/a TEXIAN 
INVESTMENTS; ROBERT J. SHOFER 
and CYNTHIA ROYCE SHOFER d/b/a 
CYN-BOB PROPERTIES; GEORGE N. 
MILLS; JACK A.FRYDRYCH and J. 
MICHAEL WEBSTER d/b/a FRYDRYCH 
& WEBSTER PARTNERSHIP 
DEVELOPMENT; GEORGE I.ADLER and 
TRANSAMERICAN AUTO PARTS d/b/a 
ADLER-TRANS INVESTMENTS; 
FRANKLIN M. CHILDS and JENNIE 
R. CHILDS d/b/a JEFRA 
HOMESHARES; BILLY J. HORN and 
SHARON P. HORN d/b/a HORN 
INVESTMENTS; LINN G. MELZER 
and MARGARET D. MELZER d/b/a 
MAR-LIN; IRA CASOFF and CHARLES 
O. GRIFFITH d/b/a CASOFF 
INVESTMENTS; JOHN M. COUSINS 
and BEVERLY J. COUSINS d/b/a 
COUSINS & COUSINS INVESTMENTS; 
DELBERT V. THOMAS and PHYLLIS 
B. THOMAS d/b/a PHILADELPHIA 
PROPERTIES; MIKE FRIZZELL and 
SUZANNE L. FRIZZELL d/b/a 
PEANUT, LTD.; ROY LEE JOHNSON 
and JANICE JOHNSON d/b/a R. J. 
JOHNSON PARTNERS; DENTON LYNN 
DUNN, DENTON LEE DUNN, DALE O. 
CHRISTENSEN, GLEN R. PENROSE 
and HOWARD RONALD STONE d/b/a 
DUNN PETROLEUM HOMESHARE;' 
partnership; FIRST SECURITY 
BANK OF UTAH; NOLAND & SONS; 
JOHN DOES 1-50 and JOHN DOES 
51-75, 
Defendants. 
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ROY B. MOORE (2308) 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
400 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 359-4100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GATE CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DONALD L. SMITH; JEDD P. JONES; 
MCB CO.; SHARAD MULTANI and 
MALATI MULTANI d/b/a MULATI AND 
SHARAD INVESTMENT CO.; RUDOLPH 
R. HANSEN and DOUGLAS E. McNEAL 
d/b/a McHANSEN PROPERTIES; 
THOMAS K. WATTS and LAURA B. 
WATTS d/b/a KARBELL; LAWRENCE 
R. JOHNSON and SAREDA BAYLE 
JOHNSON d/b/a SAREDA; NOLAND & 
SONS; ELVIS D. BURROW and DEBRA 
A. BURROW d/b/a F.D. & D.A. 
BURROW PARTNERSHIP; RAYMOND J. 
GASCON and RUTH H. GASCON d/b/a 
THE R. GASCON COMPANY; RICHARD 
E. BROWN and DOROTHY F. BROWN 
d/b/a FAN-BRO INVESTMENTS; 
DARYL B. JONES and IRENE R. 
JONES d/b/a JONES & JONES 
PARTNERSHIP; DANIEL J. AHEARN 
and ANDREA AHEARN d/b/a DANIEL 
J. AHEARN AND CASSER 
PARTNERSHIP; GLENN T. HYDE and 
CYNTHIA L. CRAWFORD d/b/a 
COMPANY 65; JAMES D. SHADOAN, 
GEORGE SCHAUB and CHARLES M. 
KAMINSKY d/b/a WOLVERINE 
INVESTMENT COMPANY; MYUNG K. 
YOON and SUN S. YOON d/b/a 
MYUNG AND SUN YOON INVESTMENTS; 
JOE L. SCHRIMSCHER and JAY 
STEVEN SCHRIMSHER d/b/a REALM 
REALTY; BRAD LARSEN and VAL 
LARSEN d/b/a PETRO ALLIANCE; 
WILLIAM S. MACADAM, JR. and 
JUDITH A. MACADAM d/b/a LUROY 
and HOWARD RONALD STONE d/b/a 
DUNN PETROLEUM HOMESHARE; 
HOMESHARE GENERAL OWNERS 
ASSOCIATION; JOHN -DOES 1-50 
and JOHN DOES 51-75, 
Defendants. 
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505 East 200 South 
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Telephone: (801) 359-4100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GATE CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
CLIVE A. PUSEY; DENNIS L. 
CROCKETT; MCB CO.; HAROLD E. 
BOLING; VIRGINIA L. BOLING; 
ALEX HALE and JEANNE HALE d/b/a 
ALEX HALE INVESTMENTS; JAMES 
SCHUESSLER and JOHN CARBERRY 
d/b/a J & J RENTAL PROPERTIES; 
R. EDWARD NOBLE, ANDREW E. KIDD 
and JAMES B. ZACHARIAS d/b/a 
NKZ PROPERTIES; ROBERT MICHAEL 
MOORE and JANICE KAY MOORE 
d/b/a MIKE AND JAN PROPERTIES; 
KEVIN T. FITZWATER d/b/a 
FITZWATER INVESTMENT GROUP; 
ROBERT L. KUTCHERA and SANDRA J. 
KUTCHERA d/b/a KUTCHERA 
INVESTMENTS; PAUL WIEGMAN and 
KENNETH T. WIEGMAN d/b/a CINDY 
PROPERTIES; JOSEPH H. BECKER 
and DIANE M. BECKER d/b/a JO 
AND DI RENTAL PROPERTIES 
COMPANY; PETER JAMES JACKSON 
and JOHN GERARD JACKSON d/b/a 
JACKSON PROPERTIES COMPANY; 
JOHN A.KIVLEHAN and CAROL A. 
KIVLEHAN d/b/a KIVLEHAN RENTAL 
PROPERTIES; DENTON LYNN DUNN, 
DENTON LEE DUNN, DALE O. 
CHRISTENSEN, GLEN R. PENROSE 
and HOWARD RONALD STONE d/b/a 
DUNN PETROLEUM HOMESHARE; 
HOMESHARE GENERAL OWNERS 
ASSOCIATION; JOHN DOES 1-50 and 
JOHN DOES 51-75, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 8081 
ROY 3. MOORE (2308) 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
400 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 359-4100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GATE CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
STEPHEN L. BLASER; MCB CO.; 
PRESTON LTD.; PAUL N. NETTLAND 
and VENNA N. NETTLAND d/b/a 
NETTLAND VACATION RENTALS; 
WAYNE C. DESSELLE and LEON 
HUGGINS, JR. d/b/a L & W 
INVESTMENTS; FRED W. STEINFORT 
and CHARLES P. CORKINS d/b/a 
STEINFORT ENTERPRISES; MICHAEL 
K. SCHUTTE and KAREN L. 
SCHUTTE d/b/a SCH-OFF 
ENTERPRISES; MARVIN L. MILLS 
and VIKKI MILLS d/b/a 
SPRINGHAUS ENTERPRISES; PETER 
HANNA and LIDIA HANNA d/b/a 
P & LH INVESTORS; JAMES L. 
BEGGS and BEVERLY H. BEGGS 
d/b/a BEGGS-INVESTMENT 
RENTALS; RICHARD DAVID PRESTON 
and MARY ANN PRESTON d/b/a 
P & P and G & P, LTD.; BARRY 
D. BLONDER and JACQUELYN 
BLONDER d/b/a TIERRA VERDE 
PROPERTIES; CHARLES H. SMITH 
and NANCY M. SMITH d/b/a S & S 
SMITH ENTERPRISES; ROBERT E. 
DAVID and KATHRYN S. DAVID 
d/b/a CRESCENTA, LTD.; JOHN 
M. SARTINSKY and HARRIETTE A. 
SARTINSKY d/b/a MICHAEL'S JOY; 
KENNETH L. HEIT and JOYCE 
ELAINE HEIT d/b/a KENJO 
PROPERTIES; ROBERT T. JONES 
and CHRIS JONES d/b/a BOB 
JONES INVESTMENTS; DENTON LYNN 
DUNN, DENTON LEE DUNN, DALE O. 
CHRTSTFNCIFN CI FN P vvhrnncv 
HOKESHARE GENERAL OWNERS 
ASSOCIATION; BRUCE and JEAN 
McMULLIN; JOHN DOES 1-50 and 
JOHN DOES 51-75, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 8082 
ROY B. MOORE (2308) 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
400 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 359-4100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GATE CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
O. JAY CALL; MAPJJEN SPENCER; 
KENNETH P. COLLEDGE; J. RAY 
FISHER; MCB CO.; WILLIAM S. 
BRUCE, PHIL C. SCHAFFER, 
TIMOTHY O. CORNELL and MELVIN 
C. BREWER d/b/a ENGLEWOOD 
PARTNERS, LTD.; BENJAMIN M. 
DOBBINS and SHIRLEY FRED 
HARTLEY d/b/a DOBBINS & HARTLEY 
INVESTMENTS; KERMIT LESLIE 
TAYLOR and JULIA L. TAYLOR 
d/b/a TAYLOR/TAYLOR LTD.; QUEST 
ENTERPRISES; NOLAND & SONS; 
JACK KECHICHIAN and BEVERLY 
KECHICHIAN d/b/a JACK AND BEV 
KECHICHIAN; ROBERT W. SMITH and 
SALLIE T. SMITH d/b/a S & T 
RENTALS; THOMAS A. OTTER, M.D. 
and BARBARA OTTER d/b/a THOMAS 
AND BARBARA OTTER RENTAL; 
RICHARD L. DIAMOND and ELAINE 
DIAMOND d/b/a R. L. & E. 
DIAMOND INVESTORS; STANLEY 
SHERMAN and RUBY SHERMAN d/b/a 
SHERMAN & SHERMAN; EDMUND L. 
GRADY and BETTYE B. GRADY 
d/b/a B & G INVESTMENTS; 
ROWLAND D. BAUMANN and 
MICHAELENE BAUMANN d/b/a 
STIRS-ALPHA PARTNERSHIP; RUBIN 
CARTER and DIANA H. CARTER 
d/b/a ALPHA-DELTA ENTERPRISES; 
ALTON M. BUJARD and STANTON 
BUJARD d/b/a VERMILION 
ENTERPISES; DAVID M. FIGLEY 
and DORIS M. FIGLEY d/b/a 
JAMES AND RANDALL PROPERTIES; 
JOEL M. BORISKIN and JUDY R. 
BORISKIN d/b/a JOEL AND JUDY 
BORISKIN RENTALS; DANNY O. 
BLACK and JANET RALSTON d/b/a 
DANNY O. BLACK PROPERTIES; 
MICHAEL J. BARKIN d/b/a HELENE 
AND MICHAEL BARKIN RENTAL; 
ROBERT A. VEDER and CAROL 
VEDER d/b/a ROBERT AND CAROL 
VEDER RENTAL; GERALD HING and 
PATRICIA Q. HING d/b/a GERALD 
AND PATRICIA PROPERTIES; ROGER 
L. HUNTER and PATRICIA Q. HING 
d./b/a R. L. HUNTER, DVM 
PROPERTIES; EFREM EYVAZOV and 
NINA EYVAZOV d/b/a EFREM AND 
NINA PROPERTIES; EDWARD A. 
HUME and JANET E. HUME d/b/a 
EDWARD AND JANET HUME 
PROPERTIES; ROBERT A. 
BLACKBURN and JOANN M. 
BLACKBURN d/b/a ROBERT AND 
JOANN BLACKBURN PROPERTIES; 
ALAN STRAUB and LYNDA STRAUB 
d/b/a ALAN AND LYNDA STRAUB 
PROPERTIES; ROBERT L. SHRADER 
and LOLA M. SHRADER d/b/a 
ROBERT AND LOLA SHRADER 
PROPERTIES; ROBERT E. MATLACK 
and JOYCE I. MATLACK d/b/a 
MATLACK INVESTORS; HENRY J. 
ORSI and ESTHER S. ORSI d/b/a 
HENRY AND ESTHER ORSI RENTALS; 
ROGER K. WEDEL and LYNN WEDEL 
d/b/a ROGER AND LYNN WEDEL 
RENTAL PROPERTIES; HOMESHARE 
GENERAL OWNERS ASSOCIATION; 
JOHN DOES 1-50 and JOHN DOES 
51-75, 
Defendants. 
ROY B. MOORE (2308) 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
400 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 359-4100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GATE CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN C. FORRESTER, III; MARVIN 
L. MILLS; MCB CO.; BRUCE 
BUMGARDNER and TERRY W. MOORE 
d/b/a BLACKTOP PROPERTIES; 
THOMAS A. SCOTT, JR., WILTS C. 
ALEXANDER and RUTHIE A. WATSON 
d/b/a BIMMER ASSOCIATES; DR. K. 
MIKE DOSSETT and BEVERLY JEAN 
DOSSETT d/b/a DOSSETT INVEST-
MENTS; AIDEN J. DOYLE and 
MARLENE L. DOYLE d/b/a DOYLE-
AIDEN INVESTMENTS; NORMAN 
GINSBURG and LYNN KIKAWA d/b/a 
MDL PARTNERSHIP; JAMES G. 
WHYBURN and LOUISE WHYBURN 
d/b/a JIMLOU WHYBURN; SUSAN P. 
SMITH and WALTER H. SMITH, JR. 
d/b/a SUWALT PROPERTIES; RONALD 
A. WALLER and J. VERNON WADE 
d/b/a WILLIN PROPERTIES; AUSSIE 
PARTNERSHIP; BILLY GENE CUTRER 
and GLORIA CUTRER d/b/a BILL 
AND GLORIA CUTRER PROPERTIES; 
FREDERICK E. MEYER and DOROTHY 
B. MEYER d/b/a SKY HEIGHTS 
UNLIMITED PARTNERSHIP; 
LOUIS ODELL-SMITH and ROSEMARIE 
ODELL-SMITH d/b/a ODELL-SMITH 
ENTERPRISES; HARVEY MARCUS 
GATTIS, JR. and CAROL SCHROEDER 
GATTIS d/b/a MAR-CAR; RICHARD 
A. CASTRO and ERNESTINE D. 
CASTRO d/b/a RDC TIMESHARE; 
GEORGE R. CARLTON, JR. and 
CHERYL ANN BOYD d/b/a CARLTON 
BOYD RENTALS; KENNETH E. VROCKE 
CHRISTENSEN, GLEN R. PENROSE 
and HOWARD RONALD STONE d/b/a 
DUNN PETROLEUM HOMESHARE; 
HOMESHARE GENERAL OWNERS 
ASSOCIATION; JOHN DOES 1-50 and 
JOHN DOES 51-75, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 8120 
APPENDIX B 
FILE NO. 8074
 T FTC. 
TV IE U PARTIES PRESENT) 
GATE CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASSN. 
V 
DANIEL W. MARCUM, ET AL 
COUNSEL: (^  COUNSEL PRESENT) 
: ROY B. MOORE & KEVIN ANDERSON 
: JOHN K. MANGUM & EARL JAY PECK 
; 
Jove D. Ovard 
CLERK 
REPORTER 
HON. J. Dennis Frederick 
JUDGE 
DATE: February 15. 1989 
BAILIFF 
COURTfS RULING: 
After review of the Memoranda and a f t e r hear ing o ra l argument in support of r e s p e c t i v e 
MOTIONS TO STRIKE, DISMISS and FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, Court r u l e s as fol lows: 
DEFENDANTSy MOTION FOR.SUMMARY JUDGMENT i s granted for the reasons t h a t the opera t ive 
documents a re c l e a r and unambiguous on t h e i r face and r e f l e c t an assumption and r e l e a s e as 
more p a r t i c u l a r l y se t fo r th in the Memorandum in Support thereof . 
Counsel for Defendants i s to prepare an appropr ia t e Order. 
Copies a re mailed t o : Clark W. Sessions, Roy B. Moore & Kevin E. Anderson, 400 First Federal Plaza, 505 
last 20J tJouthf & l t Lake City, U! &1U2 
Earl Jay Peck, John K. Mangum & Jay R. Mohlman, 1100 Beneficial Life Tower, 36 South 
State, Salt Lake City, UI 84111. 
093o 
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APPENDIX C 
Earl Jay Peck (A2562) 
John K. Mangum (2072) 
Jay R. Mohlman (5113) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Moving Defendants 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
NO. 
F I L E D 
APR 2 8 1989 & 
Clerk of Summit County 
BY UJP^ 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GATE CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDWARD A. DALTON, JR., JOHN C. 
FORRESTER, JR., MICHAEL C. 
JOHNSEN, and DANIEL W. MARCUM, 
et al., 
Defendants. 
EDWARD A. DALTON, JR., JOHN C. 
FORRESTER, JR., MICHAEL C. 
JOHNSEN and DANIEL W. MARCUM, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
GATE CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
JUDGMENT 
Consolidated Cases 
Civil Nos. 8074 
8075 
8076 
8077 
8078 
8079 
8080 
8081 
8082 
8119 
8120 
Counterclaim Defendant. 
The following Motions filed by Plaintiff Gate City 
Federal Savings & Loan Association, presently doing business as 
Gate City Federal Savings Bank (hereinafter "Gate City") and 
Defendants Edward A. Dalton, Jr., John C. Forrester, Jr., 
Michael C. Johnsen, Daniel W. Marcum, Graham Dodd, Dwight H. 
Egan, Christian E. Hansen, David E. Jones, Matthew R. White, R. 
John Eyre, Kelvyn H. Cullimore, Thomas G. Osborne, W. Truman 
Rigby, Donald L. Smith, Clive A. Pusey, Dennis L. Crockett/ 
Stephen Blaser, Marden Spencer, J. Ray Fisher, John C. 
Forrester, III, and Marvin L. Mills (hereinafter sometimes 
referred to as "Moving Defendants") in these consolidated 
actions came on regularly for hearing on February 6, 1989, at 
the Summit County Courthouse in Coalville, Utah, before the 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick: 
a. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike or Dismiss certain 
Defenses and Counterclaims or in the Alternative 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, dated January 
25, 1989, (hereinafter "Motion to Dismiss"); 
b. Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment, dated 
January 26, 1989; 
c. Defendants1 Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit 
of Vaughn Cook dated February 2, 1989; 
d. Plaintiff's Motion (made verbally in open court on 
February 6, 1989) to strike affidavit of Stephen 
L. Blaser dated January 26, 1989; 
Plaintiff Gate City was represented by Kevin E. 
Anderson of Sessions & Moore. Moving Defendants were 
represented by Earl Jay Peck and John K. Mangum of Nielsen & 
Senior. 
-2-
The Court considered the Motions and the respective 
memoranda, submissions and arguments of counsel relating 
t he r e t* i i 1 g t: h e s e ma 11 e r s i 11 t d e r a d v i s ernen t , 
a d d r e s s e d these matters by its minute entry ruling dated 
February 1-, . 2 9b9. 
d : ., - . f 
Gate City . . .- - ii . . ,i : . Reconsider said ,! . n^, *i i ^  
i .earing * H1* , ,t o:uu 
t ->• j
 ; •. ana i. ueioi e 
t it- Honorable J :*<- . w-- Frederic* . 5 * v.i-, irpreseni ed 
r .JI Sessions w- Sess :,ns ^ Moore .i -
M c " ' \*Ci jen 
& iieiuoi" • 
The Cc„' id/ n - r e v i ewed P1. a i n t i f f " s Mo 11 o n fi o 
Reco f \' ~: - t:, t„ i ve »u-111o t a11da , exh ibits, 
afficav.:;^ cAiiv; ..Lhe, submissions/ and having heard argument 
again from counsel relating thereto, 
N o w 01 «1 e i" s . i! 111 A (1 j u i.i q a s : 
1. Tin:- Mo I ,i uii of the Moving Defendants for Summary 
Judgment, dated the 26th day of January, l^ 8hll(l is qranteei, The 
Moving Defendants named hereinafter in I hi1., | I.I i jgi df ih JII 1 
rel eased from any and a 1J obligations they iitdy have had to 
Plaintiff Gate City Federal Savings ami Loan Association .. its 
predecessor-in-inter esl , Cinle City" wum linage fniupany. uride M P 
3 
following Promissory Notes, each in the original principal 
amount of $200,000.00, executed by the Moving Defendants in 
favor of Gate City Mortgage Company, and bearing the dates 
shown below, all pursuant to Paragraph 10 of said Notes, the 
Court having found that the conditions for such release have 
been met. Copies of said respective Promissory Notes have 
previously been filed as exhibits to Plaintiff's Complaints in 
the respective civil actions noted below. 
CIVIL # DATE OF NOTE MOVING DEFENDANTS WHO 
SIGNED NOTES AS BORROWERS AND 
ARE RELEASED 
8074 Dec. 14, 1981 
8075 
8076 
8077 
8078 
8079 
8080 
8081 
8082 
8119 
Dec. 
Dec. 
Nov. 
Nov. 
Dec. 
Dec. 
Dec. 
Dec. 
Dec. 
21, 1981 
30, 1981 
27, 1981 
27, 1981 
9, 1981 
9, 1981 
21, 1981 
30, 1981 
14, 1981 
Edward Ay Dalton, Jr. 
John C. Forrester, Jr 
Michael C.^ohnsen 
Daniel W. Marcum 
y 
Graham DodjJ 
Dwight H. Egan 
y 
Christian E. Hansen 
David E. Jones 
Matthew R. White 
R. John Eyre 
/ 
Kelvyn H. pullimore 
Thomas G. Osborne 
W. Truman Rigby 
Donald L. Smith 
Clive A. Py^ey 
Dennis L. Crockett 
Stephen Blaser 
Marden £pencer 
J. Ray Fisher 
e-#?> ( 
- 4 -
onni/ CCDftrXQI 0 
CIVIL # DATE OF NOTE MOVING DEFENDANTS WHO 
SIGNED NOTES AS BORROWERS AND 
ARE RELEASED 
• 
8120 Dec. John C. Foprestei , il) ^ /^}~^Z) 
Marvin L. Mills ^ ' ^ ^ 
/! Plaintiff's C <mpl a 1 nt -\ MI « aHi il Hit-be 
actions against the Mo-* ./.a Defendants :^mec ^1, .'•>.• 
are hereby dismissed. .-:*.- prejudice r -**•-• r^„no cause or 
actic ^  v- .\.r * w *-...• .;ifp 
: -, :..*...,•, i :-.=- r . j : •;:; .- Complaint., 
against the r. T. :V .. *J r; m c i p a l Defendants, Jedct m e s 
(Ci vi ^ . ooou ; ana o. u •' • | C i, v i, 1 
I > . 
The M o t i o n of Plaintiff* Gaf e Pity to D i s m i s s Is 
d e n i e d the e x t e n t that il -,rr4< i r^l n-f ifnrmti 
this J'jdijiiH i , and the balance ot said motion is rendered moot 
hereby. 
iie moc ior - - l a i nt-i f f 
nr o o r t i r , . . , . a f f i d a v - * n . t r ' . i : t*d d h o v ^ , 
a r e d e n i e d . 
: M •  J u d g m e n t r e n d e r s H I P I i mn i e r e I a i mis »»t ill 
e Moving Defendants are awarded their costs, 
which shalJ be determined pursuant t;o 1:1M pniiMsiuii i ri 
•
!
*1PS of Civil Procedure, and the 
d;uc:>r* s^ determined of $ shall accrue interest 
RMK.buPAGI-qi ', 
at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from and after 
the date of entry of this Judgment, until paid by Plaintiff 
Gate City. 
7. Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 54(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court expressly determines 
that this Judgment effectively disposes of all remaining claims 
between Plaintiff and the Moving Defendants named above and 
that there is no just reason to delay entry of final judgment 
insofar as said parties are affected by this Judgment, the 
properties securing the subject Promissory Notes having 
previously been sold at foreclosure sales, and the Court hereby 
expressly directs and orders that this Judgment be entered 
forthwith. 
8. The original of this Judgment shall be filed in 
Civil No. 8074. The Clerk of the Court is hereby directed to 
file a certified copy hereof in each of the other civil actions 
addressed by this Judgment, at no cost to the parties. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I in M'l
 ; i M I i t ) that on the _ M _ day of April, 1989, 
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed 
JUDGMENT to be placed in the united Stales w < i ] , : «el ass, 
pos f aqe pt H'|ia in 11 a111J i essL1 d to the f o I 1 ow i ng : 
Jedd P. Jones 
11756 Briarglen Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
4755 Rainbow Drive 
Murray,, Utah 841 07 
Kenneth P. Colledge 
3276 North 10th East 
Ogden, Utah 84404 
IX IIMPV Ml I'll]'! FoREGuING JUDGMENT was hand-delivered this Z*?7^ 
day of Apr 9 89 e following: 
Clark it. Sess : 
Roy B. Moore 
Kevin E. Anderson 
Sessions & Moore 
400 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 843 02 
0484o 
<2AS^er-
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APPENDIX D 
INDEMNITY AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT, made ;md entered into (his 30th
 d^ ot» December / J Q 31 b y a n d \ 
to ween C, C. International '. ../.hereinafter referred to as Part* of the 
First Part and Gate City Mortgage Company, hereinafter referred'v.to •ac iParty :bf the 
Second Port. 
WITNESSETH-
WHEREAS, Party of the First Part has obtained from the Party qf i.thr* Second Port 
.J first mortgaqe loan for the principal balance'of $200,000.00 on the following 
described property:. 
All of Lot 48, The Jeremy Ranch Plat No. 1, according to the,official plat 
thereoft recorded in the office of the Summit County .Recorder. 
Subject to and together with a right of way for the purpose of ingress and 
egress over those roadways as designated on the official plat of Jeremy Ranch 
Plat No." 1, as recorded in the Summit County Recorders office, as Entry No. 
157211, 
Situate in Summit County, State of Utah. 
DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT 
; _ L 2 
-i 
J* 
and such property is now subject to mechanics* and/or .materialmen's liens in.sofae as the time for filing 
the same is concerned and it is the desire of the Party of the First Part that such mortgage ahull be 
executed without shpwinq therein an exception for such possible l i e n s , and the P;irty of 
the Second Part i s hot agreeable thereto-unless the Party of the Hr::t Part shall 
guarantee the., discharge of such l i e n s . 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and the 'additional liability ?aity of the 
Second Part will sustain by reason of omitting to state, us an exception in such mortgage the interest of 
mechanics' and/or materialmen's lien holders (or possible lien holders), and in consideration of the benefit 
of the Party of the First Part in the conduct of its business by reason thereof, Party of the First Pari 
guarantees and Agrees as follows: 
That if the Party of the Second Part shall omit from such mortgage an exception concerning cm 
more of such liens, filed or unfiled,.and one or more such mechanics' and/or materialmen's liens, is, has 
been or may thereafter be filed or secured on the insured premises effective or relating back to a date 
prior to the date of the»policy, then, upon written demand of the Party of the Second Part, the Party of the 
First Part agrees to promptly secure the discharge of all such liens. 
In the uvenf Party of the First Part fails to promptly discharge all such liens, then Party oi' the 
Second Part, may pay, compromise, settle or discharge such liens and recover from the Party of the First 
Part such amounts so paid. 
Party of the First Part agrees upon demand to indemnify Party of the Second Part tor any loss 
(including but not limited to amounts paid in discharge of the lien ^ expenses of investigation, preparation 
for litigation, judgment, court costs, and attorney's \'c<:s) it may sustain by reason of omitting to set out 
such lien (s) as an exception in the mortgage executed hereunder or .by'reason of enforcement 
of th i s agreement. • The obligation of the Party of tho First Port in this'aqreement 
chall extend to the mortgage executed by, through, or for the Party of trie f i ro t Part 
of assigns on the above premises. ..'.•'•'/'. , ; 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands and seals the day and 
year first above written. r , . /». 
• . .„ ' I / C.jC. INTERNATIONAL 
foito City l^urtgage^ompai 
Party wrfijh? First Part 
Parry' of "the Seco\TcKlMr// ' Party of the First Part 
Stanley f/.Jk 
APPENDIX E 
CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914) 
ROY B. MOORE (2308) 
KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON (0099) 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
400 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 359-4100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GATE CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDWARD A. DALTON, JR., JOHN C 
FORRESTER, JR., MICHAEL C. 
JOHNSEN, and DANIEL W. MARCUM, 
et al., 
Defendants. 
EDWARD A. DALTON, JR., JOHN C. 
FORRESTER, JR., MICHAEL C. 
JOHNSEN, and DANIEL W. MARCUM, 
et al., 
Counterclaimants, 
v. 
GATE CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
SECOND 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
VAUGHN COOK 
Consolidated Case No. 8074 
(8075) 
(8076) 
(8077) 
(8078) 
(8079) 
(8080) 
(8081) 
(8082) 
(8119) 
(8120) 
Counterclaim Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
r S S • 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Vaughn Cook, being first duly sworn deposes and states as 
follows: 
1. I testify to all matters herein from personal knowl-
edge, 
2. The letter attached hereto as Exhibit "A", and incor-
porated herein by this reference, is a letter that I caused to be 
prepared by my secretary and sent to Michael C. Johnsen on or 
about August 26, 1982, 
3. I had enclosed with the letter a document entitled 
"Assumption Agreement1', a representative copy of which is at-
tached hereto as Exhibit ffBff, requesting that he execute the 
enclosed Assumption Agreement and return it to me to be forwarded 
to Kilburn Vacation Homeshares, Inc., a company owned by James 
Clark, which was to execute the Assumption Agreement as the party 
assuming the subject Jeremy Ranch mortgage loan obligation of 
Michael Johnsen. 
4. I presented or caused to be presented to most, if not 
all of the subject borrowers (the Defendants in the above-
captioned matter) Assumption Agreements conforming to the Assump-
tion Agreements attached hereto as Exhibit "C", when they closed 
on the subject mortgage loan transactions. 
1Q§4 
5. I don't recall if Michael C. Johnsen failed to sign an 
agreement at closing, or if the agreement he signed was l^ fit, 
necessitating the execution of another copy thereof. 
6 The Assumption Agreements attached hereto as Exhibit 
"C" were executed by all of the subject borrowers (the Defen-
dants; at t lie l;line 01 closing or shortly thereafter. 
Attached hereto as Exhibi7 "; " : • letter 1 wrote and 
mailed Gate City Mortgage Company o^ L doot* % "9, 1984, 
explaining that Kilburn Vacation Homeshares, .. . vai :.. ;e e 
assumed the subject mortgage loan obligations from the subject 
borrowers after the closing on the subject mortgage 1 oa n trans-
actions, ai id explaii ling my surprise at learning that it "had not 
completed the assumption process by requesting that Gate City 
Mortgage Company approve the assumption of the subject: mortgage 
loan obligations by ki ih"rn Vacation Homeshares, Inc., approve 
its credit, and fix the appropriate interest rate. 
8. Neither 1 , nor my company, C.C. Interna ti on al Inc , 
ever C1 t} • Mortgage Company to have our credit 
approved in connection with assuming the subject mortgage loan 
obligations, nor did we execute • "i^inc whereby Gate City 
Mortgage Company appv^ - ; ,v r^ party or 
fixed the interest rate t • be charged, - r e . w. -vr execute a 
writing to assume such obligations ^ otherwise aer^ ^ consent 
thereto , nor d:i d . _-. ..ezendants 
would be released from liability thereby. 
97:2n-3/l 1 0 & 5 
DATED this ^- day of March, 1989. 
VAUGffifl COOK 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this £ day of March, 
1989. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Presiding in Salt Lake County, UT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the £fi± day of March, 1989, the 
foregoing SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF VAUGHN COOK was served on the 
Defendants by hand delivering a true and correct copy thereof to: 
Earl Jay Peck, Esq. 
John K. Mangum, Esq. 
Jay R. Mohlman, Esq. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
m .^O r i L j * 
lOfc o 
by first-class U.S. rra LI, postage prepaid to: 
Jedd P. Jones, pro se 
11765 Briarglen Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
Donald L. Smith, pro se 
4266 Park Street 
Salt Lake City, UT S410 7 
Kenneth P. Colledge, pro se 
3276 North 1000 East 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
s 
VAUGHN COOK ^ 7 6 ASSOCIATES 
450 East 1000 North - North Salt Lake City, Utah 84054 - (801) 295-1507 
August 26, 1982 
Michael C. Johnson 
223 Mi IIcreek Way 
Tooele, Utah 84074 
Dear Mike; 
Enclosed is an Assumption Agreement from Gate City for the loan 
that you signed on the 14th of December, 1982. This loan was to stay 
in you name for six months and then Kilburn Vacation Hcmeshare was 
to come in and assume the loan. The Assumption Agreemenr needs to be 
signed by you before this process can begin. Please sign on the line 
above your name and return in the self-addressed envelope. 
If you have any questions please feel free to comact me at the 
number and/or address list on the letterhead. Ybur'prompt attention 
you Id be very much appreciated. Thank you so much for you help. 
Sincerely Yours, 
VAUGHN COOK & ASSOCIATES INC. 
JILL CHRISTENSEN 
enclosures 
-.logs; 
:EXHIBl5:iA." 
C 013008 
Gat€ City Mortgage Co. 
ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT made on the date hereinafter set forth opposite the signatures of Vendor 
and Purchaser, by and between: Dan lei W. Marcum, an unmarried man, John C. Forrester Jr . 
a married man, Edward A. Dalton J r . , a married man, I 
Michael..C Lohnsonr..a..marr-ied-man hereinafter called Vendors. 
and .J$iJ.£V/^.y.?£^ hereinafter called 
Purchasers, of property located at 8835-Jtes.l. .-SLhAan-Spur—Road. - . 
WHEREAS . . ^ l ^ J E i l y J ^ ^ S e ^ p a n y ^
 u t h e o w n e r a n d 
holder of a certain note dated ....!?t/.4.7.sl executed and delivered by Vendors or their pred-
ecessors in interest to ....Gate. C.ity..Moctgafla..Coinoanv _ .— 
in the principal amount of $ . .?.-?.' .^9.9.:.92 secured by a mortgage executed and delivered by 
Vendors or their predecessors in interest and recorded in Book .M205... of at Page 7Z.tr25 
in the .Summit County Recorder's office, State of —Utah — , 
as Document No. . I8.6.!5..5 
WHEREAS, Vendors represent that Al regular required monthly installment payments here-
tofore due and*owing under the note and mortgage have been paid and that all other obligations 
to be performed prior to the date hereof under the terms of the note and mortgage have been 
performed, and that the unpaid balance of the loan « of .... —. is $ .". — 
with interest paid to . 
WHEREAS, Purchasers have purcnased or arc now purchasing from endors the property 
covered by said Mortgage: 
NOW, THEREFORE, the said parties* in consideration of the premises ind it their mutual 
promises as herein set forth, do agree as follows: 
Purchasers assume and agree to pay said note as therein provided, and further to assume all 
the obligations of said mortgage as therein*provided, and to perform in accordance with the cov-
enants and conditions thereof. 
It is understood that Mortgagee does not release Vendor or Vendors from iirtlier umhty 
under or on account of the said note and mortgage* 
Vendors hereby transfer to Purchasers, subject to the conditions of the mortgage pertaining 
to same, ail their right, title and interest in the policy of hazard insurance and m the funds on 
deposit in escrow as payment for taxes and hazard insurance premium, and mortgage insurance 
premium, in connection with said mortgage. 
The word "note" as used herein shall be construed to mean note, bond or other instrument 
evidencing the indebtedness herein referred to. The word "mortgage" as used herein shall be con-
strued to mean mortgage, deed of trust, or other instrument securing the indebtedness herein re-
ferred to. The word "Mortgagor" shall include Trustor, and word "Mortgagee' shail include Bene-
ficiary under a deed of trust, 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this instrument has been executed by the parties lereio an the 
dates set forth opposite their names. 
Dated . ~ ^J^^^JO^J^^^^^ 
C^Wn c- F9 r^f sK r JrYe_ndor J 
Dated 
Mfchoci C. Johnson 
j . f* f**&y\*~±c_ _ 
Kilburn Vacation^onfesiTainaer 
iT5y^James M. C l a r T r V ^ - -
Purchaser 
Agent 
GCM 35 
EXHIBIT "B" 
1009 30 ^ 
G0QS7 
Gate City Mortgage Co. 
ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT made on the date hereinafter set forth opposite the signatures of Vendor 
and Purchaser, by and between: Dennis Lee Crockett, a married man & CI ive A. 
Py*?lLj...™rL.'^J™....- _ hereinafter called Vendors. 
and i5.Ll£urn „Va^ hereinafter called 
n . , «, . . . «. 3397 West Saddleback Road 
Purchasers, of property located at 
WHEREAS 9it e . . .?l lY ^ l 9 a g e _ C o : i3 t h e o w n e r a n d 
holder of a certain note dated J.?.T?.!.7.9.JL executed and delivered by Vendors or their pred-
ecessors in interest to ..Gate .Ci.tY--Mo-r.tgaga.jCo. 
in the principal amount of § ^OQ,000^00 ...secured by a Mortgage executed and delivered by 
Vendors or their predecessors in interest and recorded in BookM..20.6... of at Page Q89.T94 
in the . Summi-t County Recorder's office. State of —-Utah- ~ ~., 
as Document No. . f.?.?£?.5 
WHEREAS, Vendors represent that all regular required monthly installment payments here-
tofore due and'owing under the note and mortgage have been paid and that ali other obligations 
to be performed prior to the date hereof under the terms of the note and mortgage have been 
performed, and that the unpaid balance of the loan as of is $.~ 
with interest paid to _ 
WHEREAS, Purchasers have purchased or are now purchasing from Vendors the property 
covered by said Mortgage: 
NOW, THEREFORE, the said parties, in consideration of the premises and of their mutual 
promises as herein set forth, do agree as follows: 
Purchasers assume and agree to pay said note as therein provided, and further to assume all 
the obligations of said mortgage as therein: provided, and to perform in accordance with the cov-
enants and conditions thereof. 
It is understood that Mortgagee does not release Vendor or Vendors from further liability 
under or on account of the said note and mortgage. 
Vendors hereby transfer to Purchasers, subject to the conditions of the mortgage pertaining 
to same, all their right, title and interest in the policy of hazard insurance and in the funds on 
deposit in escrow as payment for taxes and hazard insurance premium, and mortgage insurance 
premium, in connection with said mortgage. 
The word "note" as used herein shall be construed to mean note, bond or other instrument 
evidencing the indebtedness herein referred to. The word "mortgage" as used herein shall be con-
strued to mean mortgage, deed of trust, or other instrument securing the indebtedness herein re-
ferred to. The word "Mortgagor" shall include Trustor, and word "Mortgagee' shall include Bene-
ficiary under a deed of trust. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this instrument has'^ieen executed by the par" 
dates set forth opposite their names. 
• \ \ 1 - V N 
Dated „ . ^ . . U X U ^ ^ . ^ 
DentfrstfLee CrockeYT) Vendor 
CIive A. Pusey Vendor 
j)ate(j _ _ ^JJ.^ y.ri? .^^ §lc.4Jti.pn -Hpmesha re , 
£**C ^^yPurchaser 
bynames M. Clark 
Agent Purchaser 
(uvcr) 
CCM 35 
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Gate City Mortgage Co. 
ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT made on the date hereinafter set forth opposite the signatures of Vendor 
and Purchaser, by and between: 
J.^?.!}ln.±:Jl3.s.er.'.'..*JSrr.«*d...iP.?.Cl „ hereinafter called Vendors. 
and ...KJJjLVrjCLXacatj^ _ hereinafter called 
r» u * — • i~. • A > 3493 West Saddle back Road 
Purchasers, of property located at 
WHEREAS ^?.I®.J?.Aty..^£tga£e_.Co_: _ ia t h e o w n e r a n d 
holder of a certain note dated ...Lf.-JQrrSJ executed and delivered by Vendors or their pred-
ecessors in interest to ....Gate.C.Ity...Mox±gage..Ca 
in the principal amount of $ 2P9.,000.JD0 secured by a mortgage executed and delivered by 
Vendors or their predecessors in interest and recorded in Book M2Q2... of at Page ll.Q... 
in the ..Surrmi.f. County Recorder's office, State of ...U-tati ~., 
as Document No. . . I?.7I?.9 
WHEREAS, Vendors represent that all regular required monthly installment payments here-
tofore due and*owing under the note and mortgage have been paid and that all other obligations 
to be performed prior to the date hereof under the terms of the note and mortgage have been 
performed, and that the unpaid balance of the loan as of. is %.~ ..... 
with interest paid to 
WHEREAS, Purchasers have purchased or are now purchasing from Vendors the property 
covered by said Mortgage: 
NOW, THEREFORE, the said parties, in consideration of the premises and of their mutual 
promises as herein set forth, do agree as follows: 
Purchasers assume and agree to pay said note as therein provided, and further to assume all 
the obligations of said mortgage as therein: provided, and to perform in accordance with the cov-
enants and conditions thereof. t£?rvrv*.--
It is understood that Mortgagee does not release Vendor or Vendors from further liability 
under or on account of the said note and mortgage. 
Vendors hereby transfer to Purchasers, subject to the conditions of the mortgage pertaining 
to same, all their right, title and interest in the policy of hazard insurance and in the funds on 
deposit in escrow as payment for taxes and hazard insurance premium, and mortgage insurance 
premium, in connection with said mortgage. 
The word "note" as used herein shall be construed to mean note, bond or other instrument 
evidencing the indebtedness herein referred to. The word "mortgage" as used herein shall be con-
strued to mean mortgage, deed of trust, or other instrument securing the indebtedness herein re-
ferred to. The word "Mortgagor" shall include Trustor, and word "Mortgagee' 3hail include Bene-
ficiary under a deed of trust. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this instrument has been executed by the parties hereto on the 
dates set forth opposite their names. —^ 
Dated 
Stephen L. Blaser Vendor 
Vendor 
p a t e ( i _ _ Ki 1 burn. Vacajtion-Homeshare 
, T ^ r V'/^ZeL/Purchaser 
Agent Purchaser 
1 0 1 1 , r 3G0055 
CCM 35 
Gate City Mortgage Co. 
ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT made on the date hereinafter set forth opposite the signatures of Vendor 
and Purchaser, by and between: 
Matthew R. W h i t e , a mar r i ed man 
a n c l K i l b u r n Vacat ionj- tome Share I n c . 
hereinafter calted Vendors. 
hereinafter called 
Purchasers, of property located at 37M.We§t.i.adlL5MC.l<^oa.d ..._ 
WHEREAS . . . .^ .T .? .£[?V. .^!2 |? . | ? .£ l - is the owner and 
holder of a certain note dated ..J...~JT.7...I. executed and delivered by Vendors or their pred-
ecessors in interest to .?ate..CJty...ferfcjage..CoA.. 
in tho principal amount of $ . .?.?.'^ 99.*..9.?. secured by a mortgage executed and delivered by 
Vendors or their predecessors in interest and recorded in Book M204_ of at Page JAQ.... 
in the ..Suromi t... . 
as Document No. 186118 
County Recorder's office, State of Utah..... 
WHEREAS, Vendors represent that all regular required monthly installment payments here-
tofore due and'owing under the note and mortgage have been paid and that all other obligations 
to be performed prior to the date hereof under the terms of the note and mortgage have been 
performed, and that the unpaid balance of the loan as of is $ ...J. 
with interest paid to 
WHEREAS, Purchasers have purchased or are now purchasing from Vendors the property 
covered by said Mortgage: 
NOW, THEREFORE, the said parties,, in consideration of the premises and of their mutual 
promises as herein set forth, do agree as follows; 
Purchasers assume and agree to pay said note as therein provided, and further to assume all 
the obligations of said mortgage as therein provided, and to perform in accordance with the cov-
enants and conditions thereat. 
It is understood that Mortgagee does not release Vendor or Vendors from further liability 
under or on account of the said note and mortgage. 
Vendors hereby transfer to Purchasers, subject to the conditions of the mortgage pertaining 
to same, ail their right, title and interest in the policy of hazard insurance and in the funds on 
deposit in escrow as payment for taxes and hazard insurance premium, and mortgage insurance 
premium, in connection with said mortgage. 
The word "note'* aa used herein shall be construed to mean note, bond or other instrument 
evidencing the indebtedness herein referred to. The word "mortgage" as used herein shall be con-
strued to mean mortgage, deed of trust, or other instrument securing the indebtedness herein re-
ferred to. The word "Mortgagor'* shall include Trustor, and word "Mortgagee' shall include Bene-
ficiary under a deed of trust. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this instrument has been executed by the parties hereto on the 
dates set forth opposite their names. 
Dated 
Matthew R. White 
Dated 
Vendor 
Purchaser 
Agent 
Purchaser 
1012 
GCM 35 
J C 30006*7 
Gate City Mortgage Co. 
ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT made on the date hereinafter set forth opposite the signatures of Vendor 
and Purchaser, by and between: Graham Qoad, a married man, and Owight Howard tgan, 
™?ir.L?.LT?" , - hereinafter called Vendors. 
and ^ i k u r H j a ^ hereinafter called 
Purchasers, of property located at . .3761„Wesl.Silye.r.J.pij.r..RQa.d 
WHEREAS .Gate..Ci.±y..Mar.tgaga.£a is the owner and 
holder of a certain note dated 42*21 «8-l executed and delivered by Vendors or their pred-
ecessors in interest to . G ? t e .P rt7...torr£age ~ 
in the principal amount of $ 200-,000*00- secured by a mortgage executed and delivered by 
Vendors or their predecessors in interest and recorded in Book ?!1.?.9.$... of at Page 680. _ 
in the Summit Countv Recorder's office. State of Utah , 
n . vr 186931 as Document No 
WHEREAS, Vendors represent that all regular required monthly installment payments here-
tofore due and'owing under the note and mortgage have been paid and that all other obligations 
to be performed prior to the date hereof under the terms of the note and mortgage have been 
performed, and that the unpaid balance of the loan as of is $ 
with interest paid to . . . 
WHEREAS, Purchasers have purchased or are now purchasing from Vendors the property 
covered by said Mortgage: 
NOW, THEREFORE, the said parties, in consideration of the premises and of their mutual 
promises as herein set forth, do agree as follows: 
Purchasers assume and agree to pay said note as therein provided, and further to assume all 
the obligations of said mortgage as therein* provided, and to perform in accordance with the cov-
enants and conditions thereof. 
It is understood that Mortgagee does not release Vendor or Vendors from further liability 
under or on account of the said note and mortgage. 
Vendors hereby transfer to Purchasers, subject to the conditions of the mortgage pertaining 
to same, all their right, title and interest in the policy of hazard insurance and in the fund3 on 
deposit in escrow as payment for taxes and hazard insurance premium, and mortgage insurance 
premium, in connection with said mortgage. 
The word "note" as used herein shall be construed to mean note, bond or other instrument 
evidencing the indebtedness herein referred to. The word "mortgage" as used herein shall be con-
strued to mean mortgage, deed of trust, or other instrument securing the indebtedness herein re-
ferred to. The word "Mortgagor" shall include Trustor, and word "Mortgagee' shail include Bene-
ficiary under a deed of trust. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this instrument has been executed by the parties hereto on the 
dates set forth opposite their names. 
Grahataiodd' ^j3^Jy*^Q* 
Owight^Jwar^ Eqa-fj/ Vendor 
Dated m ^J^L^J^S3^!}^P^e^.re 
1013 
by..James..M....Clark 
Purchaser 
Agent 
(over) 
J&0C63 
JC 
CCM 35 
Gate City Mortgage Co. 
ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT made on the date hereinafter set forth opposite the signatures of Vendor 
and Purchaser, by and between: C h r i s t i a n £ . Hansen, A married man, and David E. 
J o n e s , a married man 
hereinafter called Vendors. 
and llLLt?Mrn.j3JC.ation...HQ0)e...SMr.a...lnc# 
Purchasers, of property located at ^211?.?.!lr?.!}3J.ILlll.. 
hereinafter called 
WHEREAS ....M«.J?JIy..?S?.d,.ga9e. is the owner and 
holder of a certain note dated ...1.2-.5Q-.8LI executed and delivered by Vendors or their pred-
ecessors in interest to Gate C i.ty.-Mor-t^age - -
in the principal amount of $ 200,000. . .Q.Q. ...secured by a mortgage executed and delivered by 
Vendors or their predecessors in interest and recorded in Book M203... of at Page 5 2 2 -
in the . . ^ . T . ' . t County Recorder's office, State of « Y.T<?* , 
as Document No 
WHEREAS, Vendors represent that all regular required monthly installment payments here-
tofore due and*owing under the note and mortgage have been paid and that ail other obligations 
to be performed prior to the date hereof under the terms of the note and mortgage have been 
performed, and that the unpaid balance of the loan aa of is $ , 
with interest paid to ... 
WHEREAS, Purchasers have purchased or are now purchasing from Vendors the property 
covered by said Mortgage: 
NOW, THEREFORE, the said parties, in consideration of the premises and of their mutual 
promises as herein set forth, do agree as follows: 
Purchasers assume and agree to pay said note as therein provided, and further to assume ail 
the obligations of said mortgage as therein, provided, and to perform in accordance with the cov-
enants and conditions thereof. 
It is understood that Mortgagee does not release Vendor or Vendors from further liability 
under or on account of the said note and mortgage. 
Vendors hereby transfer to Purchasers, subject to the conditions of the mortgage pertaining 
to same, all their right, title and interest in the policy of hazard insurance and in the funds on 
deposit in escrow as payment for taxes and hazard insurance premium, and mortgage insurance 
premium, in connection with said mortgage. 
The word "note" as used herein shall be construed to mean note, bond or other instrument 
evidencing the indebtedness herein referred to. The word "mortgage" as used herein shall be con-
strued to mean mortgage, deed of trust, or other instrument securing the indebtedness herein re-
ferred to. The word "Mortgagor" shall include Trustor, and word "Mortgagee' shall include Ben 
ficiary under a deed of trust. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this instrument has been' exectrfed by the pa; 
dates set forth/fcpposite their names. / ' / ' / 
Dated 
/ / 
3es hereto/on the 
/ 
UJUL£-
Dated fon^JlomesTiare 
. ^ .. *
=L_ C---^trrehaser 
by James M. Clark 
Agent 
Purchaser 
1014 
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Gate City Mortgage Co. 
ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT made on the date hereinafter set forth opposite the signatures of Vendor 
and Purchaser, by and between: Kelvyn H Cullimore, a married man, Thomas G. Osborne, 
? . . . ! ? . £ I L ? . ! ^ hereinafter called Vendors, 
and ^A.!.^ .yr.1?...y^5r.?-t29n..y9 .^..%?X.®s„J.i?.9.. hereinafter called 
Purchasers, of property located at 8.7.75..Wes.t..S.U.Yjaf_Spiir..i?Qad 
WHEREAS G a t e C ' t y M o r t 9 a 9 e Co_; ..«.*«*.—*.« __.... : is the owner and 
holder of a certain note dated ...!.?~9?.?.?..[ executed and delivered by Vendors or their pred-
ecessors in interest to .... Gate .Ci.ty..Mor.Tsa.ge...CQ*... 
in the principal amount of $ O^QfQOO.OQ secured by a mortgage executed and delivered by 
Vendors or their predecessors in interest and recorded in BookM.20.5. of . at Page 386.-90 
in the .Summit County Recorder's office. State of Utah , 
as Document No. . 186503 
WHEREAS, Vendors represent that all regular required monthly installment payments here-
tofore due and*owing under the note and mortgage have been paid and that all other obligations 
to be performed prior to the date hereof under the terms of the note and mortgage* have been 
is $. performed, and that the unpaid balance of the loan as of 
with interest paid to 
WHEREAS, Purchasers have purchased or are now purchasing from Vendors the property 
covered by said Mortgage: 
NOW, THEREFORE, the said parties, in consideration of the premises and of their mutual 
promises as herein set forth, do agree as follows: 
Purchasers assume and agree to pay saidr note as therein provided, and further to assume all 
the obligations of said mortgage as therein provided, and to perform in accordance with the cov-
enants and conditions thereof. 
It is understood that Mortgagee does not release Vendor or Vendors from further liability 
under or on account of the said note and mortgage. 
Vendors hereby transfer to Purchasers, subject to the conditions of the mortgage pertaining 
to same, all their right, title and interest in the policy of hazard insurance and in the funds on 
deposit in escrow as payment for taxes and hazard insurance premium, and mortgage insurance 
premium, in connection with said mortgage. 
The word ••note" as used herein shall be construed to mean note, bond or other instrument 
evidencing the indebtedness herein referred to. The word "mortgage" as used herein shall be con-
strued to mean mortgage, deed of trust, or other instrument securing the indebtedness herein re-
ferred to. The word "Mortgagor" shall include Trustor, and word "Mortgagee' shall include Bene-
ficiarv under a deed of trust 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this instrument has lereto on the 
dates set forth opposite their names. 
Dated Tn"6^ s""(!>r"0sb*Orne"* Vendor 
<.<4t /,4: W."Truman Rigby Vendor. 
Dated Mlb.y.ni..yac.itiQn.-Hon-esha re.... 
Purchaser 
CCM 35 
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Gate City Mortgage Co. 
ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT made on the date hereinafter set forth opposite the signatures of Vendor 
and Purchaser, by and between:Madden Spencer, a married man, Kenneth Paul Col ledge, 
a married man, J. Ray Fisher , a married man, and 0 . Jay 
CaJ.l^..a.inarr.ied..maa hereinafter called Vendors, 
and KM burn Vacat ion Homeshare J_nc. hereinafter called 
Purchasers, of property located at ...380.5„West^.i.lye.r.ifi.U.cR.Qa.d 
WHEREAS ?.a!.t.CLly"*?.^!^ is the owner and 
holder of a certain note dated ...:.£"...Z.J- executed and delivered by Vendors or their pred-
ecessors in interest to .G£?e CIty_MprJgage..Coi_. 
in the principal amount of $ . . . . . . '? / . .? .? . ...secured by a mortgage executed and delivered by 
Vendors or their predecessors in interest and recorded in Book M?.Q5... of at Page 7.1.3-.j 7 
in the .. Summit County Recorder'3 office, State of Utafr , 
as Document No. . 1.86651 
WHEREAS, Vendors represent that all regular required monthly installment payments here-
tofore due and'owing under the note and mortgage have been paid and that all other obligations 
to be performed prior to the date hereof under the terms of the note and mortgage have been 
J s $.. performed, and that the unpaid balance of the loan as of... 
with interest paid to 
WHEREAS, Purchasers have purchased or are now purchasing from Vendors the property 
covered by said Mortgage: 
NOW, THEREFORE, the said parties, in consideration of the premises and of their mutual 
promises as herein set forth, do agree as follows: 
Purchasers assume and agree to pay said note as therein provided, and further to assume all 
the obligations of said mortgage as therein-provided, and to perform in accordance with the cov-
enants and conditions thereof. 
It is understood that Mortgagee does not release Vendor or Vendors from further liability 
under or on account of the said note and mortgage. 
Vendors hereby transfer to Purchasers, subject to the conditions of the mortgage pertaining 
to same, all their right, title and interest in the policy of hazard insurance and in the funds on 
deposit in escrow as payment for taxes and hazard insurance premium, and mortgage insurance 
premium, in connection with said mortgage. 
The word "note" as used herein shall be construed to mean note, bond or other instrument 
evidencing the indebtedness herein referred to. The word "mortgage" as used herein shall be con-
strued to mean mortgage, deed of trust, or other instrument securing the indebtedness herein re-
ferred to. The word "Mortgagor" shall include Trustor, and word "Mortgagee' shall include Bene-
ficiary under a deed of trust. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this instrument has been executed by the parties hereto on the 
dates set forth opposite their names. //? '* •*.*/•-•> A •> .••/•.. 
Dated ~ 
Dated 
J ^ R a y ^ F i s n e r Vendor 
0 . Jay C a l I 
Purchaser 
Kilburn Vacation-Homeshare 
by James M. C T a n c ^ " " 
(wverr ent 
1016 
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Gate City Mortgage Co. 
ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT made on the date hereinafter set forth opposite the signatures of Vendor 
and Purchaser, by and between: Marvin I . Mi Ms, a married man, and John C. Forrester 
}}1:..±!^H^..^ « hereinafter called Vendors. 
and K|J.!?uniL.Y3?J!^ hereinafter called 
Purchasers, of property located at 5.8.i.5...Wg.?t...S.ily.eC^SP.ur...Bo.a.cl _ 
WHEREAS .. J ^ L t L ^ ^ . Co.
 i s t h e Q W n e f a n d 
holder of a certain note dated ..}.~~.....Z?J. executed and delivered by Vendors or their pred-
ecessors in interest to Gate..Ci.ty..Mo.rtgage..Cg.. _ 
in the principal amount of $ ..?.?..'09?.:.9.9. secured by a mortgage executed and delivered by 
Vendors or their predecessors in interest and recorded in-8ookM?5.5 of at Page3!.?.?.?.? 
in the Summit Countv Recorder's off ice, State of Utah , 
n „ v 186692 as Document No 
WHEREAS, Vendors represent that ail regular required monthly installment payments here-
tofore due and'owing under the note and mortgage have been paid and that ail other obligations 
to be performed prior to the date hereof under the terms of the note and mortgage have been 
performed, and that the unpaid balance of the loan as of is $ — 
with interest paid to „ 
WHEREAS, Purchasers have purchased or are now purchasing from Vendors the property 
covered by said Mortgage: 
NOW, THEREFORE, the said parties, irrconsideration of the premises and of their mutual 
promises as herein set forth, do agree as follows: 
Purchasers assume and agree to pay said note as therein provided, and further to assume all 
the obligations of said mortgage as therein provided, and to perform in accordance with the cov-
enants and conditions thereof. 
It is understood that Mortgagee does not release Vendor or Vendors from further liability 
under or on account of the said note and mortgage. 
Vendors hereby transfer to Purchasers, subject to the conditions of the mortgage pertaining 
to same, all their right, title and interest in the policy of hazard insurance and in the funds on 
deposit in escrow as payment for taxes and hazard insurance premium, and mortgage insurance 
premium, in connection with said mortgage. 
The word "note" as used herein shall be construed to mean note, bond or other instrument 
evidencing the indebtedness herein referred to. The word "mortgage" as used herein shall be con-
strued to mean mortgage, deed of trust, or other instrument securing the indebtedness herein re-
ferred to. The word "Mortgagor" shall include Trustor, and word "Mortgagee' shall include Bene-
ficiary under a deed of trust. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this instrument haa been executed by the parties hereto on the 
dates set forth opposite their names. 
Dated - ^./jy^Ute&AX-. 
nn L. Mil Is Vendor i l l s ^ 
^6hn C. Forrester 11 Vendor 
Dated - « .J5J.J.fe!Ann..yA^io^p^e?Mr!?. 
byJames M. C 
5^/^^^P>TTchaser 
Agent Purchaser 
(wcr) 
1017 JC ob 
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Gate City Mortgage Co. 
ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT made on the date hereinafter set forth opposite the signatures of Vendor 
and Purchaser, by and between: Donald Lewis Smith, 3 married man and Jedd P, Jones, 
a
..™rS.}**..m.a.n. hereinafter called Vendors, 
and i5.!J.!?H.C.O ..Y.a.c.3T.!.9.n...h?9m£..Sha.C.© J.n.c... hereinafter cailed 
D . - • , • , , •
 8 8 25 West S i l v e r Spur Road 
Purchasers, of property located at I. 
WHEREAS .95t?.£!.lY...Mor?.9?.9?„°£i_ _ .. :* the owner and 
holder of a certain note dated . )?.~Q?~.?.L executed and delivered by Vendors or their pred-
ecessors in interest to Gate C ity..ivtant.gage..C.a^. 
in tho principal amount of $ 200,000.00 secured by a mortgage executed and delivered by 
Vendors or their predecessors in interest and recorded in Book M20.9. of at Page 29r53 
in the Summit . County Recorder's office, State of Utah. 
as Document No. . , 8 7 7 2 1 
WHEREAS, Vendors represent that all regular required monthly installment payments here-
tofore due and*owing under the note and mortgage have been paid and that all other obligations 
to be performed prior to the date hereof under the terms of the note and mortgage have been 
performed, and that the unpaid balance of the loan as of is $ 
with interest paid to 
WHEREAS. Purchasers have purchased or are now purchasing from Vendors the property 
covered by said Mortgage: 
NOW, THEREFORE, the said parties, in consideration of the premises and of their mutual 
promises as herein set forth, do agree as follows: 
Purchasers assume and agree to pay said note as therein provided, and further to assume all 
the obligations of said mortgage as therein provided, and to perform in accordance with the cov-
enants and conditions thereof. 
It in understood that Mortgagee does not release Vendor or Vendors from further liability 
under or on account of the said note and mortgage. 
Vendors hereby transfer to Purchasers, subject to the conditions of the mortgage pertaining 
to same, all their right, title and interest in the policy of hazard insurance and in the funds on 
deposit in escrow as payment for taxes and hazard insurance premium, and mortgage insurance 
premium, in connection with said mortgage. 
The word "note'* as used herein shall be construed to mean note, bond or other instrument 
evidencing the indebtedness herein referred to. The word "mortgage" as used herein shall be con-
strued to mean mortgage, deed of trust, or other instrument securing the indebtedness herein re-
ferred to. The word "Mortgagor" shall include Trustor, and word "Mortgagee" shall include Bene-
ficiary under a deed of trust. 
IN* WITNESS WHEREOF, this instrument has been executed by the parties hereto on the 
dates set forth opposite their names. 
Dated £ - ^ ^ ^ . j ^ ^ / A ^ ! r ^ . ? . y ; / . ^ . : y 
Oonaid Lewis Smith v«n<*or 
2k^'.^^£l 
Jedd P. Jones Vendor 
Dated ... .Ki.lb.ur.n..Va.cat.ion.-Homeshare 
. &-?^*~~jSp purchaser 
Purchaser 
J O 0083 
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Gate City Mortgage Co. 
ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT made on the date hereinafter set forth opposite the signatures of Vendor 
and Purchaser, by and between: Dan iei W. Marcum, an unmarried man, John C. Forrester Jr. 
a married man, Edward A. Qalton J r . , a married man, I 
Mic*aei..C Lohnsoar..a..mar.r.ied-*»n ~ ~ hereinafter called Vendors. 
an(j KM burn VacatJon^Ho^me^S^ hereinafter called 
Purchasers, of property located at 8835.Jtes.t-..£iXv^~Spur.Jtaad 
WHEREAS G a t e C ' I y !!!0.rli?£e. ~?.?~y- i 3 t h e o w n € r a n d 
holder of a certain *n"oi"*daTed"**ir?*JOIZri^ execut^ ed and delivered by Vendors or their pred-
ecessors in interest to ....Gatft.Cli.ty..Mo.ctgaflSL..Company -
in the principal amount of $ . .29.9..'999.:.9Q. ...secured by a mortgage executed and delivered by 
Vendors or their predecessors in interest and recorded in Book M2.Q.5... of at Page 721.-25 
in the ...Summit County Recorder's office, State of —Utah.. , 
as Document No. . i8.6.6.?.5 
WHEREAS, Vendors represent that ail regular required monthly installment payments here-
tofore due and'owing under the note and mortgage have been paid and that ail other obligations 
to be performed prior to the date hereof under the terms of the note and mortgage have been 
performed, and that the unpaid balance of the loan as of is % -~ 
with interest paid to - . 
WHEREAS. Purchasers have purchased or are now purchasing from Vendors the property 
covered by said Mortgage: 
NOW, THEREFORE, the said pix-ties, in consideration of the premises and of their mutual 
promises as herein set forth, do ayree as follows: 
Purchasers assume and agree to pay said note as therein provided, and further to assume all 
the obligations of said mortgage as therein*provided, and to perform in accordance with the cov-
enants and conditions thereof. _ 
It is understood that Mortgagee does not release Vendor or Vendors from further liability 
under or on account of the said note and mortgage. 
Vendors hereby transfer to Purchasers, subject to the conditions of the mortgage pertaining 
to same, all their right, title and interest in the policy of hazard insurance and in the funds on 
deposit in escrow as payment for taxes and hazard insurance premium, and mortgage insurance 
premium, in connection with said mortgage. 
The word "note" as used herein shall be construed to mean note, bond or other instrument 
evidencing the indebtedness herein referred to. The word "mortgage" as used herein 3hall be con-
strued to mean mortgage, deed of trust, or other instrument securing the indebtedness herein re-
ferred to. The word "Mortgagor" shall include Trustor, and word "Mortgagee' shall include Bene-
ficiary under a deed of trust. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, thus instrument has been executed by the parties hereto on the 
dates set forth opposite their names. 
Dated - ~ JSkhl* /^^ 
r
 fan C. Forfes*sr JrY e n d o r * 
Dated 
Mfchaei C. John^an 
Kilburn Vacatior^onftLfihAaser 
Purchaser 
Agent 
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Gate City Mortgage Co. 
ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT made on the date hereinafter set forth opposite the signatures of Vendor 
and Purchaser, by and between: 
.l\..i0.^...!y.r.e.r.a..ma.r:ri.ic!...^.?. _ _ hereinafter called Vendors. 
and lLL^Vrn..^.?Xi?.^..^°^...?Mr.?.J.!?.?.: _ hereinafter called 
Purchasers, of property located at ...38.45.„W9S£..SilxaC..SwiC.8aail 
WHEREAS ° a . ! i . £ ! l Y Mortgage_Co: ,s ( h e o w n e f a n d 
holder of a certain note dated .......r.J.ZzL executed and delivered by Vendors or their pred-
ecessors in interest to ... &3/re C i ty. ^ r t ^ a g e .Co_._. _ 
in the principal amount of $ °.9.'™?.:.9S. secured by a mortgage executed and delrvered by 
Vendors or their predecessors in interest and recorded in Book M2Q4... of at Page .'6.7.... 
in the Summit County Recorder's office, State of Utah , 
a* Document No. . , 8 6 . ! 2 1 
WHEREAS. Vendors represent that ail regular required monthly installment payments here-
tofore due and*owing under the note and mortgage have been paid and that all other obligations 
to be performed prior to the date hereof under the terms of the note and mortgage have been 
performed, and that the unpaid balance of the loan as of is $ 
with interest paid to 
WHEREAS. Purchasers have purchased or are now purchasing from Vendors the property 
covered by said Mortgage: 
NOW, THEREFORE, the said parties, in consideration of the premises and of their mutual 
promises as herein set forth, do agree as follows: 
Purchasers assume and agree to pay said note as therein provided, and further to assume all 
the obligations of said mortgage as therein, provided, and to perform in accordance with the cov-
enants and conditions thereof. 
It is understood that Mortgagee does not release Vendor or Vendors from further liability 
under or on account of the said note and mortgage. 
Vendors hereby transfer to Purchasers, subject to the conditions of the mortgage pertaining 
to same, all their right, title and interest in the policy of hazard insurance and in the funds on 
deposit in escrow as payment for taxes and hazard insurance premium, and mortgage insurance 
premium, in connection with said mortgage. 
The word "note" as used herein shall be construed to mean note, bond or other instrument 
evidencing the indebtedness herein referred to. The word "mortgage" as used herein shall be con-
strued to mean mortgage, deed of trust, or other instrument securing the indebtedness herein re-
ferred to. The word "Mortgagor" shall include Trustor, and word "Mortgagee' shall include Bene-
ficiary under a deed of trust. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this instrument has been executed by the parties hereto on the 
dates set forth opposite their names. / 
Dated 
Dated 
-R. Idm Eyre /Vendor 
Vendor 
Kilbum Vacation-Homeshare 
by James M. Clark 
Purchaser Agent 
1020 JCoGOOBl 
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Carl Cc'i^sr 
Gate Citv Mortgage 
1225 South B c V s a s t Suite 210 
0 r e m. Utah 
o z r, <; 7 
Dear* Carl: 
On behalf of those individuals listed en the attached page, I am 
writing a formal response to your delinquency letter mailed. 
As you kno#. the hordes in questioon have been owned and payments 
have been n.ede by Kilburn Vacation Homeshare. Inc. for the la'-t 
2. J*/- years. It was a condition of sale from the prior owners 
that these mortgages be assumed by Kilburn. . I think you 
are aware of this inasmuch as you have worked with Kilburn during 
th~t period on the assumption process. It was my assumption (no 
oun intended) that this process had been completed based on my 
conve• sations with Kilburn during tha last year and due to the 
fact no payment information or correspondence to my knowledge'had 
been sent to the prior owners. 
Up an hearing of Kilburn's current financial stresses. and upon 
confirmation of the fact that no assumption had been made.. I 
negotiated a purchase of the homes from Kilbuirn. They are 
presently owned by MCB Cc. 
My main interest in this unfortunate situation is to see that 
protracted foreclosure proceedings and unnecessary hassles to 
prior owners are avoided. To accomplish this I am proposing (as 
1 have previously over the phone) that Gate City Mortgage accept 
deads in lieu of foreclosure immediately - thereby putting the 
property into your ownership, and absolute control. 
I am not interested in anv negative counter-productive 
proceedings uith any party involved. but am not in a position to 
incur a loss in this matter. If it becomes necessary to protect 
MCE and it's ether "asets with more dramatic measures, I will not 
hi^itate to take them. Let me reassure you, my first choice is 
to see that deeds are transferred and am prepared to follow 
t h o u g h for you in this way at the present time. 
Sincerely, 
Vaughn Cook 
PS. I am expecting to talk with Eill Lively the first of next 
we.?1* as a continuation of our conversation of yesterdav. I am 
optomistic things can work out satisfactorily for all of us. 
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UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
1. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this 1 s t ! day of J a n u a r y , A. D.. 1982—. 
by and between Stephen L. B laser . a married man 
hereinafter designated as the Seller, and CC Internat iona l , a Utah Corporation 
hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of C/o Vauqhn COOk and A s s o c i a t e s . I n c . 45Q E a s t
 u 
1000 North North Salt Lake City, Utah 84054
 i , 
2. WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell an! convey to the %iy«r, 
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, situfte in 
the county of Summit
 S u t e of Uuh# ^ . ^ 3780 West Saddleback Road Park West 
More particularly described as follows: L o t 4 8 , The Jeremy ftancn P l a t NO. 1 , 
according to the official plat thereof, recorded in the office of the 
Summit County Recorder. 
Subject to and together with a right^of way for the pur^o^e of ingress 
and egress over those foadways as designated on the official plat of 
Jeremy Ranch Plat No. 1, as recorded*in the Summit County Recorders Of-
fice, as Entry No. 157211. 
.Situated in Summit County, State of Sah. 
3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pafTfor said described premises the sum of tWQ 
hundred ninety f i v e thousand, four hundred seventy one &48/10Q
 D on a r s { t 2 9 5 , 4 7 1 . 4 8 } i [ 
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order s e e OeiOW I j 
•trictiy within the following times, to-wit:ni,netyfiye thousand four hundrprispypntyoigy 4B/inQf.35,$71,.4£ 
cash, the receipt of which ia hereby acknowledged, and the balance of $ 2 0 0 , 0 0 0
 t 8hall be paid aa follows: 
Buyer agrees to take property subject to first mortgage to Gate City 
Mortgage dated December 30, 1981, and to assume, or cause the same 
to be assumed by any subsequent buyer. 
Possession of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the * S * day of J a n u a r y , IQ 8 ^ 
4. Said monthly payment* are to be applied first to the payment of interest and seeond to the reduction of the 
principal. Interest shall be charged from $ e e a b o v e \
 o n *]] unpaid portions of the 
purchase price at the rate of S e e SPOVe
 p e r c e n t ( s e e apOVe^ j p e r l n n u m > The Buyer, at his option at anytime, 
maty pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage 
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future 
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment is made. 
5. It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less than according 
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract at to the forfeiture 
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller. 
6. It ia understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property in favor of G a t e C i t y 
Mortgage (which buyer agrees to be respons ib le for)
 withmnuipmidUIlBCtof 
$200,000.00 ;—. as of , December 30, 1981 — ~ ; i . ' -
7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said prem-
ises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said prop-
erty, except the following nonQ t 
8. The Seller is given the Option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of dot io exceed the 
then unpaid contract balance hAunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to exceed "A • i < percent 
{ UX- 7*) per annum and pltyable in regular monthly installments; provided that the agrregate monthly Installment 
payments required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be greater than each installment payment required to be 
made by the Buyer under this contract. When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such 
loans and mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property 
subject to said loans and mortgages. JL 
». II the Buyer desires to exercise his right through accelerated payments under this agreement*to my off any obli-
gationa outstanding at date of this agreement against said property, it shall be the Buyer's obligatioafrto assume and 
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior obligations. Prepayment penalities in respect 
to obligations against said property incurred by seller, after date of this agreement, shall be paidj>y seller uniesa 
said obligations, are assumed or approved by buyer. I j ^ 
10. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender Idr a loan of such 
amount as can be secured under the regulations of said lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount io received upon 
the purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the papers required and pay one-half the expenses necessary in ob-
taining said loan, the Seller agreeing to pay the other one-half, provided however, that the •monthJy; payments and 
interest.rate required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and interest rata aa outlined above. • } 
11. The Buyer agrees to pay ail taxes and assessments of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed 
and which may Decome due on these premises during the life of this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees 
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following: 
It is agreed that any assessments that may be against the property which are not 
known of this time shall be the responsibility of buyer and Alta Title. 
The Seller further covenants and agrees that he will not default in the payment of his obligations against said property. 
12. The Buyer agrees to pay th«. Kencral taxes after December i 1981 
13. The Buyer further agrees to keep all insurable buildings and improvements on said premises insured in a com-
pany acceptable to the Seller in the amount of not less than the unpaid balance on this contract, or % _ _ 
and to assign said insurance to the Seller as his interests may appear and .to deliver the insurance policy to him. 
14. In the event the Buyer shall default in the puyment of any special or general taxes, assessments or insurance 
premiums as herein provided, the Seller may, ut his option, pay said taxes, assessments and insurance premium* or cither 
of them, and if Seller elects so to do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon demand, all such tumi so advanced 
and paid by him, together with interest thereon from date of payment of said sums at the rate of % of one percent per 
month until paid. 
16. Buyer agrees that he will not commit or Buffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon 
said premises, and that he will maintain said premises in good condition. 
16. In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make 
any payment or payments when the same shall become due, or within f j f t e o n days thereafter, the 
Seller, at his option shall have the following alternative remedies: 
A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure* of the Buyer to remedy the default within five dnys after written notice, 
to be released from all obligations in law and in equity to convey said property, and ail payments which have 
been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for 
the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his option re-enter ana take 
possession of 5aid premises without legal processes as in its first and former estate, together with ail improve-
ments and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvements shall remain with 
the land become the property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller; or 
B. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgment for all delinquent installments, including coats and Attorneys 
fees. (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting 
to one of the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default): or 
C. The Seller shAll have the right, at his option, and upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid 
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this continct as a note and mortgage, and pass 
title to the Buyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of 
the State of Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing, 
including costs and attorney's fees; and the Seller may have a judgment for any deficiency which may remain. 
In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to 
the appointment of a receiver to take possession of said mortgaged property and collect the rents, issues and 
profits therefrom and apply the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant 
to order of the court; and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession 
of the said premises during the period of redemption. 
17. It is agreed that time is *he essence of this agreement. 
18. In the event there are any liens or encumbrances against said premises other than those herein provided for or 
referred to, or in the event any liens or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue against the 
same by acts or neglect of the Seller, then the Buyer may, at his option, pay and discharge the same and receive credit 
on the amount then remaining djie hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the pay-
ments herein provided to be made, may, at the option of the Buyer, be suspended until such time as such suspended 
payments shall equal any sums advanced as aforesaid. 
19. The Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned 
agrees to execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the 
above described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except aa may have accrued 
by or through the acts or neglect of the Buyer, and to furnish at his expense, a policy of title insurance in the amount 
of the purchase price or at the option of the Seller, an abstract brought to date at time of sale or at any time during the 
term of this agreement, or at time of delivery of deed, at the option of Buyer. 
20. It is hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property 
in its present condition and that there are no representations* covenants, or agreements between the parties hereto with 
reference to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained here-
in, that the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise 
or accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any 
remedy provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit 
or otherwise. 
22. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, auc-
cessors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said parties to this agreement have hereunto signed their names, the day and year 
first above written. 
Signed in the presence of,. "-» 
If^is understood that at such time as 
the underlying mortgage is assumed by 
buyer or its assigns, then this con-
tract shall be deemed fully executed 
and paid 
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APPENDIX G 
Gate City Mortgage Co. 
ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT made on the date hereinafter set forth opposite the signatures of Vendor 
and Purchaser, by and between: Dennis Lee Crockett, a married man & Clive A. 
P
^ e v ^ a ^ r r i e d j n a n _ _ _ hereinafter called Vendors. 
and .K i.j.burn...Vacat ion..Home..Share...j.nc. hereinafter ca 11 ed 
n . - „ . . , . 3397 West Saddleback Road 
Purchasers, of property located at 
WHEREAS 9^?S!.%^Il^SiSSz is the owner and 
holder of a certain note dated .].?'.?.!.T.?.L executed and deiivered by Vendors or their pred-
ecessors in interest to ..Gate. CI.tv..MQCtga^a.£a 
in the principal amount of $ . ?00,pOO..OO ...secured by a rrtortgage executed and delivered by 
Vendors or their predecessors in interest and recorded in BookM„20.6... of at Page 639-9.4 
in the ..Suxnmi.t . . .. County Recorder's off fee, State of -Utah.. ..., 
as Document No. . }*?$}.?. 
WHEREAS, Vendors represent that all regular required monthly installment payments here-
tofore due and*owing" under the note and mortgage have been paid and that all other obligations 
to be performed prior to the date hereof under the terms of the note and mortgage, have been 
performed, and that the unpaid balance of the loan as of. is $ ^ 
with interest paid to . 
WHEREAS. Purchasers have purchased or are now purchasing from Vendors the property 
covered by said Mortgage: 
NOW, THEREFORE, the said parties* in consideration of the premises and of their mutual 
promises as herein set forth, do agree as follows: 
Purchasers assume and agree to pay said, note as therein provided, and further to assume all 
the obligations of said mortgage as theretarprovided, and to perform in accordance with the cov-
enants and conditions thereof. _ _• - -
It is understood that Mortgagee does not release Vendor or Vendors from further liability 
under or on account of the said note and mortgage. 
Vendors hereby transfer to Purchasers, subject to the conditions of the mortgage pertaining 
to same, all their right, title and interest in the policy of hazard insurance and in the funds on 
deposit in escrow as payment for taxes and hazard insurance premium, and mortgage insurance 
premium, in connection with said mortgage. 
The word "note" as used herein shall be construed to mean note, bond or other instrument 
evidencing the indebtedness herein referred to. The word "mortgage" as used herein shall be con-
strued to mean mortgage, deed of trust, or other instrument securing the indebtedness herein re-
ferred to. The word "Mortgagor" shall include Trustor, and word "Mortgagee' shall include Bene-
ficiarv under a deed of trust. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this instrument haa^been executed by the patti«$Jiereto on the 
dates set forth opposite their names. \ 
Dated 
rrsaLee Croc kern Vendor — \ 
Clive A, Pusey Vendor 
Dated _ Kjjburn_^ 
S"-<^ ^rvPurchaser 
bynames M. Clark 
Agent Purchaser 
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October 8, 1931 
Marv Mills 
4527 South 2300 East 
Holladay, Utah 84117 
Dear Marv,. 
. This letter is just a follow-up on bur Park City financing pro-
gram that you are participating in. I want to be sure that you have 
a written description of what we are doing as well as have a follow-
up on any legal documents involved so that we all know that the bases 
have been properly covered right from the start. As I have explained, 
I am building 26 homes for a man named Jim Clark in the Jeremy-Ranch 
subdivision in Summit County. Jim is in the business of timesharing 
these homes out and because of the tax shelter aspects involved, his 
timeshare program has been, and is for 1981, very successful. 
At the beginning of this year when I entered into the contract 
with Jim, we pursued financing on the basis of one loan for the entire 
package with Jim as the mortgagor. We soon found that there was no 
money available in the secondary market for such a loan which is to 
say the lending institutions were interested in the loan, but found 
that they had no buyer for that type of mortgage in today's market. 
As a result of this problem we arranged with the bank to finance each 
home on an individual basis. What this required was to have between 
one and three individuals who would qualify and take out the mortgage, 
or effectively, buy the home. We further agreed with the banks that 
all mortgages would be assumable and that after the mortgage is placed, 
Jim Clark would be able to assume those mortgages. This program ac-
complished my purpose in providing me with the funding needed to de-
liver the homes to Jim. It also satisfied the needs of the banks be-
cause it gives them a mortgage that they can sell on the secondary mar-
ket. 
In developing this program I allocated proceeds from each home to 
be paid to those individuals willing to help finance the homes. This 
money is to be split by the individuals qualifying for that home. Pres-
ently we have committments on homes under construction and where pos-
sible we'll process you with the lending institutions in such a way as 
to qualify you for more than one home. Inasmuch as I am successful in 
doing this you will receive additional fees. Enclosed you will find 
two documents. The first is a guarantee from Jim that he will assume 
any mortgage we place on "your" home. Although I have a firm contract 
-2-
wi:h Jini t h a t g ives me h is gua ran tee , I f e l t t ha t i t would be use-
V,d] to have him extend h is guarantee to you in w r i t i n g , so tha t you 
a r e assured of h i s f u r t h e r performance. The second item i s an as -
r^nment of i n t e r e s t on any proper ty we p resen t ly have you committed 
• 3 finance. "' ' ~'"' " '^ ~' l l "' ~~ " " " 
that the proper 
ticn or delay, 
interest on any property e presently nave you co itted 
This assignment of interest serves as a guarantee to Jim 
)erty will be transferred to him at closing without ques-
I appreciate your help in this matter and am looking forward to 
a smooth closing prior to the end of the year. 
Sincerely, 
\L 
~7 
VAUGHN R COOK 
VRC:kO 
Enclosures 
017095 
fa (>**< o o> 
*fou'H notice that the^-cssignments and guarantee l e t t e L 
, .* not been signed. These items will be signed on the 
-I'ific homes as we make those assignments. I wanted you 
1'nave a copy to see what they would look like. 
K i lbu rn Yacat ion-Homeshare , I n c . does hereby gua ran tee 
to assume or cause to-be- assumed by t h i s c o r p o r a t i o n , or i t s 
s u b s i d i a r i e s o r a s s i g n s , t h e mortgage t o be p l a c e d on t h e 
p r o p e r t y known as Lot if , Jeremy Ranch S u b d i v i s i o n , S u n l i t 
County, Utah . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t fo l lowing your c l o s i n g of 
s a i d mortgage on s u b j e c t p r o p e r t y t h i s c o r p o r a t i o n , or i t s 
s u b s i d i a r i e s , or a s s i g n s s h a l l t a k e t i t l e to s a i d p r o p e r t y and 
as p a r t of t h e t i t l e t r a n s f e r , assume t h a t mortgage .from you. 
KILBUHN VACATION-HOiSSKARE, INC. 
By: 
I t s Agent 
VAUGHN COOKlI l i^ i l i y & ASSOCIATES 
450 East 1000 Noah - Noah Salt Loke Gey. Utah 64054 - (601) 295-1507 
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October 6, 1981 
John C. Forrester, III 
3409 East Magic View Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Dear Jack, 
This letter is just a follow-up on bur Park City financing pro-
gram that you are participating in. I want to be sure that you have 
a written description of what we are doing as well as have a follow-
up on any legal documents involved so that we all know that the bases 
have been properly covered right from the start. As I have explained, 
I am building 26 homes for a man named Jim Clark in the Jeremy Ranch 
subdivision in Summit County. Jim is in the business of timesharing 
these homes out and because of the tax shelter aspects involved, his 
timeshare program has been, and is for 1981, very successful. 
At the beginning of this year when I entered into the contract 
with Jim, we pursued financing on the basis of one loan for the entire 
package with Jim as the mortgagor. We soon found that there was no 
money available in the secondary market for such a loan which is to 
say the lending institutions were interested in the loan, but found 
that they had no buyer for that type of mortgage in today's market. 
As a result of this problem we arranged witfcL-tha-hank. to finance each ^  
hPjne_on_ajiJ^ What this required was to have between 
one and three individuiTIT^who would qualify and take out the mortgage, 
or effectively, buy the home. We further agreed with the banks that 
all mortgages would be assumable and that after the mortgage is placed, 
Jim Clark would be able to assume those mortgages. This program ac-
complished my purpose in providing me with the funding needed to de-
liver the homes to Jim. It also satisfied the needs of the banks be-
cause it gives them a mortgage that they can sell on the secondary mar-
ket. 
In developing this program I allocated proceeds from each home to 
be paid to those individuals willing to help finance the homes. This 
money is to be split by the individuals qualifying for that home. Pres 
ently we have committments on homes under construction and where pos-
sible we'll process you with the lending institutions in such a way as 
to qualify you for more than one home. Inasmuch as I am successful in 
doing this you will receive.additional fees. Enclosed you will find 
two documents. The first is a guarantee from Jim that he will assume 
any mortgage we place on "your" home. Although I have a firm contract 
0QGQ13 
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with Jim that gives me his guarantee, I felt that it would be use-
ful to have him extend his guarantee to you in writing, so that you 
are assured of his further performance. The second item is an as-
signment of interest on any property we presently have you committed 
to finance. This assignment of interest serves as a guarantee to Jim 
that the property will be transferred to him at closing without ques-
tion or delay. 
I appreciate your help in this matter and am looking forward to 
a smooth closing prior to the end of the year. 
Sincerely, 
\I<M 
VAUGHN R COOK 
VRC:ko 
Enclosures 
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450 East 10C0 Noah - Noah Soit Lake Gey. Utah 54054 - (601) 295-1507 
October 6,- 1981 
J, Ray Fisher 
606 East 3550 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Dear Ray, 
This letter is just a follow-up on bur Park City financing pro-
gram that you are participating in. I want to be sure that you have 
a written description of what we are doing as well as have a follow-
up on any legal documents involved so that we all know that the bases 
have been properly covered right from the start. As I have explained, 
I am building 26 homes for a man named Jim Clark in the.-"Jeremy Ranch 
subdivision in Summit County. Jim is in the business of timesharing 
these homes out and because of the tax shelter aspects involved, his 
timeshare program has been, and is for 1981, very successful. 
At the beginning of this year when I entered into the contract 
with Jim, we pursued financing on the basis of one loan for the entire 
package with Jim as the mortgagor. We soon found that there was no 
money available in the secondary market for such a loan which is to 
say the lending institutions were interested in the loan, but found 
that they had no buyer for that type of mortgage in today's market. 
As a result of this problem we arranged with .the bank to finance each 
home on an individual basis. What this required was to have between 
one and three individuals who would qualify and take out the mortgage, 
or effectively, buy the home. We further agreed with the banks that 
all mortgages would be assumable and that after the mortgage is placed, 
Jim Clark would be able to assume those mortgages. This program ac-
complished my purpose in providing me with the funding needed to de-
liver the homes to Jim. It also satisfied the needs of the banks be-
cause-it gives them a mortgage that they can sell on the secondary mar-
ket. 
In developing this program I allocated proceeds from each home to 
be paid to those individuals willing to help finance the homes. This 
money is to be split by the individuals qualifying for that home. Pres-
ently we have committments on homes under construction and where pos-
sible we'll process you with the lending institutions in such a way as 
to qualify you for more than one home. Inasmuch as I am successful in 
doing this you will receive additional fees. Enclosed you will find 
two documents. The first is a guarantee from Jim that he will assume 
any mortgage we place on "your" home. Although I have a firm contract 
CGiOl8 
- 2 -
with Jim that gives me his guarantee, I f e l t that i t would be use-
ful to have him extend his guarantee to you in writ ing, so that you 
are assured of his further performance. The second item is an as-
signment of interest on any property we presently have you committed 
to finance. This assignment of interest serves as a guarantee to Jim 
that the property wi l l be transferred to him at closing without ques-
tion or delay. 
I appreciate your help in this matter and am looking forward to 
a smooth closing prior to the end of the year. 
Sincerely, 
VAUSHN R COOK 
VRC:ko 
Enclosures 
C OCiOlS 
450 Eosc 1000 North • North Solt lefce Qty, Utoh 64054 - (601) 295-1507 
October 6, 1981 
R. John Eyre 
2464 Murray Holladay Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Dear John, 
This letter is just a follow-up on bur Park City financing pro-
gram that you are participating 1n. I want to be sure that you have 
a written description of what we are doing as well as have a follow-
up on any legal documents involved so that we all know that the bases 
have been properly covered right from the start. As I have explained, 
I am building 26 homes for a man named Jim Clark in the Jeremy Ranch 
subdivision in Summit County. J1m is in the business of timesharing 
these homes out and because of the tax shelter aspects involved, his 
timeshare program has been, and is for 1981, very successful. 
At the beginning of this year when I entered into the contract 
with Jim, we pursued financing on the basis of one loan for the entire 
package with J1m as the mortgagor. We soon found that there was no 
money available in the secondary market for such a loan which is to 
say the lending institutions were interested in the loan, but found 
that they had no buyer for that type of mortgage in today's market. 
As a result of this problem we arranged with the bank to finance each 
home on an individual basis. What this required was to have between 
one and three individuals who would qualify and take out the mortgage, 
or effectively, buy the home. We further agreed with the banks that 
all mortgages would be assumable and that after the mortgage is placed, 
Jim Clark would be able to assume those mortgages. This program ac-
complished my purpose in providing me with the funding needed to de-
liver the homes to Jim. It also satisfied the needs of the banks be-
cause it gives them a mortgage that they can sell on the secondary mar-
ket. 
In developing this program I allocated proceeds from each home to 
be paid to those individuals willing to help finance the homes. This 
money is to be split by the individuals qualifying for that home. Pres-
ently we have committments on homes under construction and where pos-
sible we'll process you with the lending institutions in such a way as 
to qualify you for more than one home. Inasmuch as I am successful in 
doing this you will receive additional fees. Enclosed you will find 
two documents. The first is a guarantee from Jim that he will assume 
any mortgage we place on "your" home. Although I have a firm contract 
•OWN A PIECE OF THE DIRT/ 
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with Jim that gives me his guarantee* I felt that it would be use-
ful to have him extend his guarantee to you in writing, so that you 
are assured of his further performance. The second item is an as* 
signment of interest on any property we presently have you committed 
to finance. This assignment of interest serves as a guarantee to Jim 
that the property will be transferred to him at closing without ques-
tion or delay. 
I appreciate your help in this matter and am looking forward to 
a smooth closing prior to the end of the year. 
Sincerely, 
Xio^^cJC^— 
/AUGHN R CO VA OK 
VRC:ko 
Enclosures 
1
 C 0G2003 
450 East 1000 Noah - North 5olt Lake Gty, Utah 64054 - (601) 295-1507 
October 8, 1981 
Ed Dal ton 
Erda, Utah 84074 
Dear Ed, 
This letter is just a follow-up on our Park City financing pro-
gram that you are participating in. I want to be sure that you have 
a written description of what we are doing as well as have a follow-
up on any legal documents involved so that we all know that the bases 
have been properly covered right from the start. As I have explained, 
I am building 26 homes for a man named Jim Clark in the Jeremy Ranch 
subdivision in Summit County, Jim is in the business of timesharing 
these homes out and because of the tax shelter aspects involved, his 
timeshare program has been, and is for 1981, >/ery successful. 
At the beginning of this year when I entered into the contract 
with Jim, we pursued financing on the basis of one loan for the entire 
package with Jim as the mortgagor. We soon found that there was no 
money available in the secondary market for such a loan which is to 
say the lending institutions were interested in the loan, but found 
that they had no buyer for that type of mortgage in today's market. 
As a result of this problem we arranged with the bank to finance each 
home on an individual basis. What this required was to have between 
one and three individuals who would- qualify and take out the mortgage, 
or effectively, buy the home. We further agreed with the banks that 
all mortgages would be assumable and that after the mortgage is placed, 
Jim Clark would be able to assume those mortgages. This program ac-
complished my purpose in providing me with the funding needed to de-
liver the homes to Jim. It also satisfied the needs of the banks be-
cause it gives them a mortgage that they can sell on the secondary mar-
ket. 
In developing this program I allocated proceeds from each home to 
be paid to those individuals willing to help finance the homes. This 
money is to be split by the individuals qualifying for that home. Pres-
ently we have committments on homes under construction and where pos-
sible we'll process you with the lending institutions in such a way as 
to qualify you for more than one home. Inasmuch as I am successful in 
doing this you will receive additional fees. Enclosed you will find 
two documents. The first is a guarantee from Jim that he will assume 
any mortgage we place on "your" home. Although I have a firm contract 
C di>S046 
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with Jim that gives me his guarantee, I felt that it would be use-
ful to have him extend his guarantee to you in writing, so that you 
are assured of his further performance. The second item is an as-
signment of interest on any property we presently have you committed 
to finance. This assignment of interest serves as a guarantee to Jim 
that the property will be transferred to him at closing without ques-
tion or delay. 
I appreciate your help in this matter and am looking forward to 
a smooth closing prior to the end of the year. 
Sincerely, 
VAUGHN R COOK 
VRC:ko 
Enclosures 
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October 6 , 1981 
Daniel W. f-'arcum 
65 Aoricot Avenue 
Sa l t 'Lake C i ty , Utah 84103 
:0 £>sn 
Deer Dan5 
This le t te r is just a follow-up on bur Park City financing pro-
gram that you are participating in . 1 want to be sure that you have 
a written description of what we are doing as well as have a follow-
up on any legal documents involved so that we all know that the bases 
have been properly covered right from the s t a r t . As I have explained, 
I am building 26 homes for a man named Jim Clark in the Jeremy Ranch 
subdivision in Summit County. Jim is in the business of timesharing 
these homes out and because of the tax shelter aspects involved, his 
timeshare program has been, and is for 1981, very successful. 
At the beginning of this year when I entered into the contract 
with Jim, we pursued financing en the basis cf one lean for the entire 
package with Jim as the mortgagor. We scon found that there was no 
•noney available in the secondary market for such a loan which is to 
say the lending institutions were interested in the loan, but found 
that they had no buyer for that type cf mortgage in today's market. 
As a result of this problem we arranged with the bank to finance each 
home on an individual basis. What this required was to have between 
one and three ind;v-cucls who woul j qualify and take o\r. the mortgage, 
or effectively, buy the home. We further agreed with the banks that 
all mortgages would be assumable and that after the mortgage is placed, 
Jim Clark would be able to assume those mortgages. This program ac-
complished my purpose in providing me with the funding needed to de-
l iver the homes to Jim. It also satisfied the needs of the banks be-
cause i t aives them a mortgage that they can sell on the secondary mar-
ket. 
P 
mo 
s 
t 
As 
In developing this orocram allocated proceeds t™** *%*? 
?res-
s to be sp l i t i>y une ^ - ^ l ^ construction and where 
ently we have c o n t i n e n t s on ho..* no r c
 i o n s -n s u c h 8 , B y as 
s i b l e w e ' l l process you wi uh ^ - i n -
 h . < } ^ successful in 
*r cualifv vou for more then one home. -
 w l | 1 : - n c 
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APPENDIX I 
57-15-8. Procedure for assumption — Request to lender — 
Effect of failure to request — Approval or refusal 
by lender — Information furnished by lender, 
(1) In order to effect an assumption under this chapter the original bor-
rower, or, if the secured party has previously approved, and pursuant to that 
approval there has been effected, an assumption of the indebtedness secured 
by an instrument representing a security interest in real estate, the person 
last approved as an assumer and who has assumed the indebtedness shall give 
to the lender a written notice and request for assumption. The lender shall 
either approve or reject a prospective assumer within 30 days after the writ-
ten notice and request for assumption is received from the original borrower 
or the party last approved as an assumer. The lender may refuse to release the 
original borrower or the party last approved as an assumer and who has 
assumed if the secured party has previously approved the assumption of the 
indebtedness, from liability for the payment of the indebtedness to be as-
sumed. With respect to any transfer involving an assumption effected after 
the effective date of this act, if the written notice and request for an assump-
tion is not timely made before a transfer or within 90 days after transfer, the 
lender may call the entire loan balance due without a determination that the 
security interest is substantially impaired, if that option is provided for in the 
original loan agreement. 
(2) The lender shall provide the original borrower or, if the indebtedness 
has been assumed with the previous approval of the lender, the person last 
approved with a statement of loan condition within 14 days after receipt of 
written notice and request. The statement shall include the following infor-
mation: (a) the amount of the unpaid balance on the secured loan; (b) the 
interest rate; (c) the amount of the monthly loan installment; (d) the date or 
dates any real estate taxes and special assessments were last paid; (e) the 
amount of hazard insurance in effect if that information is contained in the 
records of the lender; and (f) the amount of any impound balance reserve for 
payments of taxes, special assessments, and insurance. 
532 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
